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Localizing Climate Change Action
Myanna Dellinger*
ABSTRACT
Waiting for national- and supranational-level actors to
reach a broadly based and substantively effective agreement on
climate change mitigation is like waiting for Godot—unlikely to
happen, at least at a substantively early enough point in time.
The December 2012 negotiations under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
umbrella yet again demonstrated the problem in seeking widely
accepted action from close to two hundred nations with widely
divergent interests in climate change and the related underlying
issues. This article adds new value to existing scholarship by
conducting original research into select climate initiatives at the
sub-national, sub-state level in order to find out whether it is
worth pursuing climate change action at this level instead. The
article posits that in times with little or severely delayed climate
change action by national and supranational actors, it is worth
pursuing climate change action at the local—but not the purely
private—level.
After identifying what “success” means in the climate
change arena, the article analyzes the potential for both
substantive and procedural success presented by select local
initiatives. Some of these feature traditional adversarial
enforcement methods, some feature modern collaborative-style
enforcement, some feature no enforcement at all, and one is a
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reporting program with mandatory implications. This article
demonstrates how action at the scaled-down level can be
effective whether traditional adversarial, or more collaborative
goal enforcement methods are applied, and perhaps even if no
enforcement methods are applied at all.
The article builds on the author’s parallel project, An
Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental and Human Rights
Law from the Bottom Up.1 This article analyzes bottom-up,
polycentric developments within national and international
environmental and human rights law in general. It argues that
bottom-up, polycentric action presents viable alternatives to
traditional top-down action within these areas and presents a
set of guidelines for the development and enforcement of law
that apply to action within climate change and thus to this
article as well.
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Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does
anything about it.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Fortunately, the above saying is no longer true. Some
attempts have been and are made around the world to curb
climate change.3 Unfortunately, these have produced very few
actual, promising results so far.4 Numerous scholarly articles
have been written lamenting the lack of effective action at, in
particular, the state, national, or supranational level and
discussing the need for local action instead.5 This article builds
on such scholarship, but adds new value by conducting original
research into select climate initiatives at the sub-national, substate level in order to analyze whether it is worth pursuing
2. Quote is commonly attributed to either Mark Twain or Charles
Dudley Warner.
3. See, e.g., Plastic Bag Ban in LA Approved by City Council, Paper Bags
to be 10 Cents, HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2012, 4:00 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/plastic-bag-ban-la_n_1540478.html
[hereinafter Plastic Bag Ban] (discussing Los Angeles’ efforts to encourage
citizens not to use plastic bags); Andrew Winston, The Challenge of Climate
Math, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/andrew-winston/the-challenge-of-climate-_b_2189004.html
(discussing different global efforts toward environmental conservation).
4. See Wynne Parry, UNEP Greenhouse Gas Emissions Report Finds
Climate Change Goals Growing More Elusive, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23,
2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/23/unep-greenhousegas-emissions_n_2179270.html.
5. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for
Global Problems: State, Local, and Private Leadership in Developing
Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 16–28 (2004) (discussing the effectiveness of local
government and private groups in filling the voids left the Federal
Government in fighting climate change).
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climate change action at this scale at all. To do so, the article
analyzes the particular factors that are considered to make
environmental law initiatives successful as well as risk factors
of which both law and policymakers should be aware. The
article is among the first to set forth a framework of reference
for analyzing what “success” means in the environmental law
context with a particular focus on climate change and to apply
this framework to the analysis of programs to analyze whether
they may be considered effective currently or have the potential
for being so in the future. Since this appears to be the case for
most programs, the article posits that in times with little or
delayed climate change action by national and supranational
actors, it is worth pursuing climate change action at the local—
but not the purely private—level. Further, the article shows
how action at the scaled-down level can be effective whether
traditional adversarial or more collaborative goal enforcement
methods are applied, or perhaps even where no enforcement
methods are applied at all.
The article builds on the author’s parallel project, An
Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental and Human Rights
Law from the Bottom Up.6 The parallel article analyzes bottomup, polycentric developments within national and international
environmental and human rights law.7 It posits that such
action presents viable alternatives to traditional top-down
action and describes why.8 The article presents value in the
form of a set of guidelines from the human rights and
environmental law arenas that can be applied to future
developments of modern law in both arenas, but also in more
specialized segments of the law such as climate change action.9
As described in the author’s parallel article, clear comparisons
between human rights and climate change can be drawn.10 For
example, severe weather caused by climate change may affect
our health and ultimately our lives, thus impacting the human
rights to health and life. Our property rights may be at peril
because of climate change as well.11 In 2008, the UN Human

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Carbon

Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2).
Id.
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 76–90).
Id. (manuscript at 38–41).
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change,
Sequestration, and Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 377–86
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Rights Council officially recognized the fact that “climate
change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people
and communities around the world and has implications for the
full enjoyment of human rights.”12 Accordingly, the principles
for law creation, observance, and enforcement produced in the
parallel article apply to the present article as well; as do the
guidelines set forth in that article for effective law creation at
the scaled-down and potentially non-governmental level.
While we discuss what to do and how best to do it, the
climate situation keeps getting more and more dire.13 We
already let several precious years go by without any real
progress in the area.14 The severity of this will be set forth in
Part II by way of a brief factual background.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
This article takes the starting point that climate change
exists, is manmade, and needs to be addressed effectively
now—within a few years at the most—in order to avoid severe
planetary effects. The article will thus not re-discuss that body
of knowledge other than providing the following update of the
state of scientific, economic, and legal affairs to demonstrate
the now extreme urgency of the problem.
A. THE SCIENCE
In May 2012, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) National Climatic Data Center
released a report showing that the average temperature in the
United States between March and May was 57.1ºC, which is
5.2ºC above the long-term average from 1901 to 2000.15 Before
(discussing issues that may arise as carbon sequestration becomes an
attractive solution to limit the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere,
and specifically pointing out the property issues that arise when the
government wants to store the carbon dioxide in pores beneath citizens’ land).
12. Human Rights and Climate Change, Human Rights Council, 7th
Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.21/Rev.1 (Mar. 26, 2008).
13. See generally Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,
ROLLING STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, at 52, 53–60 (discussing the climate goals that
must at a minimum be met and why that might not even be enough); Parry,
supra note 4.
14. See Parry, supra note 4 (pointing out that as countries continue to
make pledges to lower carbon emissions, the gap between those pledges and
the level of reductions to cap global warming at 2ºC is widening, and that
greenhouse gas emissions may already be at such a high level that we may not
be able to avert the worst consequences of global warming).
15. Michael Pearson & Phil Gast, More Record Warmth as Scientists Warn
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May 2012, the United States experienced twelve consecutive
months with temperatures in the top third of recorded monthly
average temperatures.16 The odds of that happening randomly
are 1 in 540,000.17 Globally, the average April 2012
temperature was 1.17ºC warmer than the average from the
past century.18 That was the 327th consecutive month that
global temperatures exceeded the 20th century average.19 The
odds of that happening by simple chance are higher “than the
number of stars in the universe.”20 NASA scientist James
Hansen, the “Godfather of Global Warming,”21 states that the
likelihood of temperatures similar to the global heat waves of
recent years was rarer than 1 in 300 from the 1950s through
the 1980s.22 Now, the odds are closer to 1 in 10.23 Mr. Hansen
stated that “statistically what’s happening is not random or
normal, but pure and simple climate change.”24 The United
States Supreme Court and at least two United States Courts of
Appeals have taken note of this.25
of Global Tipping Point, CNN.COM (June 8, 2012, 5:37 PM),
http://articles.cnn.com/
2012-06-08/us/us_record-warmth_1_climate-changenoaa-nature-article?_s=PM:US.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. McKibben, supra note 13, at 52 (this figure was based on 327
consecutive months of above average temperatures including May 2012).
21. New Study Links Current Events to Climate Change,
INDEPENDENTMAIL.COM (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.independentmail.com/
news/2012/aug/04/new-study-links-current-events-climate-change/?print=1.
22. Doyle Rice, NASA Scientist Ties Heat Waves to Global Warming, USA
TODAY (Aug. 4, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/climate/
globalwarming/story/2012-08-04/heat-waves-climate-change-jameshansen/56794570/1.
23. Id.
24. New Study Links Current Events to Climate Change, supra note 21.
25. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007) (noting
that in recent decades, “[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has
coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of [greenhouse gases]
in the atmosphere”); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d
102, 120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (similarly relying on the EPA’s “substantial
scientific evidence” showing that “anthropogenically induced climate change
threatens both public health and public welfare” and commenting that “[t]his
is how science works, and, additionally, the EPA is not required to re-prove
the existence of the atom every time it approaches a scientific question”);
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil, 696 F.3d 849, 857, 858 (9th Cir. 2012)
(referring to the “dire circumstance” in which the village of Kivalina finds
itself because of the rising sea level caused by climate change, but relying on
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What must be done about this problem? The 2007
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Synthesis
Report stated that to keep the global average temperature
increase from pre-industrial levels within 2–2.4ºC, carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions must be reduced by 50–85% from 2000
levels by 2050 and peak by 2015.26 The “167 countries
responsible for more than 87 percent of the world’s carbon
emissions have signed on to the Copenhagen Accord, endorsing
the two-degree target,” which is just about “the only thing
about climate change that the world has settled on.”27 The 2012
Doha agreement reached under the auspices of the United
Nations Framework Conference for Climate Change (UNFCCC)
reaffirmed the two degree target.28 But it is looking more and
more unlikely that goal can be met. For example, the
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has, according to a
2012 UN report, jumped 20% since 2000.29 Additionally, an
individual would have to have a footprint of no more than 1.1
metric tons of CO2 from their direct energy use to allow for an
80% reduction by 2050.30 As an illustration, individuals in the
United States produced 18.6 metric tons of CO2 per person in
2008.31 In total amounts, one calculation shows that global

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011) in holding
that relief must come from the legislative and executive branches of the
government, not the courts via federal common law nuisance claims).
26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 67 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007). In
2011, the chief economist for the International Energy Agency projected that
current global energy consumption levels put the Earth on a trajectory to
warm by 6ºC above pre-industrial levels by 2100, an outcome he called “a
catastrophe for all of us.” Juliet Eilperin, World on Track for Nearly 11-Degree
Temperature Rise, Energy Expert Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/world-on-track-fornearly-11-degree-temperature-rise-energy-expertsays/2011/11/28/gIQAi0lM6N_story.html (mentioning the “2 degree” goal).
27. McKibben, supra note 13, at 55.
28. Ban Welcomes Outcome of UN Climate Change Talks in Doha, UNITED
NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=43716#.UMjE1454VW4.
29. Karl Ritter, 2012 UN Climate Talks in Doha, Qatar Face Multiple
Challenges,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
25,
2012,
10:51
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/25/2012-un-climate-talksqatar_n_2188048.html.
30. RACHEL HOWELL, UK ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE, THE EXPERIENCE
OF CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS: IMPLICATIONS FOR A PERSONAL
CARBON ALLOWANCES POLICY 19 (2009), available at http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/
publications/downloads/howell09crags.pdf.
31. CO2 Emissions, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
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anthropogenic emissions must be reduced to approximately 44
metric gigatons of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) by 2020 to stay
within the 2ºC goal.32 However, at the end of 2009, total global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions amounted to 49.5 GtCO2e.33
The emissions gap between what is necessary to avoid
catastrophic climate change and projected emissions continues
to widen instead of narrow.34 Thus, it may already have become
unrealistic to strive for “only” a 2ºC limit.35 Indeed, a recent
World Bank projection showed that temperatures are more
likely to increase up to 4ºC by the end of this century over preindustrial times, thus overshooting the target on which most
UN talks have been based so far.36 The chief economist of the
International Energy Agency cites to evidence showing that
temperatures are likely to rise by 11ºC, “which would create a
planet straight out of science fiction.”37 In fact, temperatures
have already risen by almost 0.8ºC and, because of previously
released carbon is likely to rise another 0.8ºC, the world is
already three-quarters of the way to the “bottomest of bottom
lines” two-degree target.38 The world can afford to add only
approximately “565 more gigatons of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere by midcentury and still have some reasonable hope
of staying below two degrees. (‘Reasonable,’ in this case, means
four chances in five, or somewhat worse odds than playing
Russian roulette with a six-shooter.)”39
B. THE ECONOMY
The above description paints a very bleak picture of the
state of affairs and the uphill battle to be fought. Perhaps it is
already too late to realistically hope for effective mitigation of

EN.ATM.CO2E.PC (last visited Feb. 12, 2013) (showing per capita emission
levels reflecting the burning of fossil fuels and manufacture of cement by
nation and year).
32. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, BRIDGING THE
EMISSIONS GAP: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT 9, 16 (2011), available at
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_bridging_gap.pdf.
33. Id. at 15.
34. Parry, supra note 4.
35. See id.
36. Ritter, supra note 29.
37. McKibben, supra note 13, at 55.
38. Id. at 54–55.
39. Id. at 55.
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the problem.40 Perhaps adaptation is the best we can do at this
point in time.41 However, the problem is too severe to simply
give up even trying.42 Further, relatively sudden and effective
turn-arounds of severe scientific and moral problems of
international importance have been seen before. For example,
extensive campaigning in the 1980s demanded and obtained
financial divestment from companies doing business in South
Africa because of the apartheid problem.43 Currently,
campaigns against sweat shops and child labor appear to add
leverage against companies acquiring products produced in
morally reprehensible ways.44 The ozone layer problem was
virtually resolved by the Montreal Protocol in a relatively short
amount of time.45 However, one major difference between the
ozone depletion problem and climate change is that with the
ozone problem, President Reagan embraced aggressive action
at an early point in time to solve the problem because of a belief
in the cost-benefit analysis which, at bottom, made action
cheaper than inaction.46 In contrast, the financial advantages
of taking action against climate change have not yet become
persuasive, at least in the United States, although one can
hope that this will change with more awareness of the financial
benefits of taking action.47 For example, the size of the “climate
economy” is estimated to be $2.2 trillion by 2020.48 Other
countries are taking note of this: China’s budget for energy

40. See Parry, supra note 4.
41. See McKibben, supra note 13, at 57 (“Changes to weather patterns
that move crop-production areas around – we’ll adapt to that.” (quoting Exxon
CEO, Rex Tillerson)).
42. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 4 (discussing the importance of avoiding a
4°C jump, and noting that although difficult, it is still possible to avoid).
43. McKibben, supra note 13, at 60.
44. See generally B.J. Bullert, Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops, and
the Making of a Global Movement (Joan Shorenstien Ctr., Working Paper No.
14, 2000), available at http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/03/2000_14_bullert.pdf
(discussing
campaigns
against
Nike’s
sweatshops).
45. See, e.g., Frances Beinecke, Solving the Ozone Layer: Lessons for
Fighting Climate Change, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/saving_the_ozone_layer_lessons.ht
ml.
46. See Winston, supra note 3.
47. See McKibben, supra note 13, at 52–53 (observing the fact that
President Obama chose not to attend the twentieth anniversary reprise of an
environmental summit in Rio that was previously attended by President
George H.W. Bush).
48. Winston, supra note 3.
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conservation and anti-pollution measures over the next few
years is $372 billion.49 In contrast, the global clean energy
investment in 2011 was $260 billion.50 Saudi Arabia is
planning to invest $109 billion in its solar industry over the
next twenty years.51 Frequently cloudy Germany has, through
early and focused investments, become the world leader in
solar power whereas most parts of sunny America are only now
rolling out solar programs, but arguably still only at a
negligible scale given the abundance of the natural resource.52
A very significant obstacle to climate change solutions is
precisely the carbon economy and the companies, even nations,
who are heavily invested in this.53 Whereas we can add only
565 gigatons of fossil fuels to stay within the world recognized
2ºC goal, the carbon contained in the proven coal, oil, and gas
reserves of fossil-fuel companies and the countries that act as
such—e.g., Venezuela and Kuwait—amounts to 2,795 gigatons;
five times more than the “safe” limit.54 Those reserves are the
primary assets—worth approximately $27 trillion—of oil
companies, such as ExxonMobile or Lukoil.55 If the reserves of
these firms were all to be burned, “[they] would use up more
than a quarter of the remaining two-degree budget.”56 These
companies are obviously not going to give up on such lucrative
assets and further opportunities for growth in their fields, and
are doing quite the opposite: in March 2012, “Exxon CEO Rex
Tillerson told Wall Street analysts that the company plans to
spend $37 billion a year through 2016 (about $100 million a
day) searching for yet more oil and gas.”57 This industry alone
holds the power to change the chemistry of our planet, and it is
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. (noting that during one sunny day in May, Germany was able
to supply fifty percent of the nations required power through its solar energy
network—a world record); see also Herman K. Trabish, Sunshot Program:
Your Tax Dollars at Work Growing Solar, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/SunShot-Program-Your-TaxDollars-at-Work-Growing-Solar.
53. See Jeff Coelho, Analysis: Climate Impasse Could Kill Carbon Offset
Investment, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/10/31/us-cdm-investment-climate-idUSTRE79U4YA20111031.
54. McKibben, supra note 13, at 55–56.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Id. at 57.
57. Id.
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planning to use it. As for the advice by the business sector in
general as to what to do “if” scientists turn out to be correct, the
position of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is simply that
“populations can acclimatize to warmer climates via a range of
behavioral, physiological and technological adaptations.”58 This
problem is extreme indeed and clearly needs to be addressed
somehow, whether through legislative action, hopeless as it
may seem currently given the sheer strength of the carbon
industry, or through investor-driven and other action.
C. THE LACKING POLITICAL AND LEGAL ACTION
Although time is running out quickly, there is still a very
small window of time in which to act to attempt to avoid at
least the very worst effects of climate change. However, taking
beneficial advantage of this window will require swift and
decisive action by a multitude of actors around the world at
multiple scales. Until recently, focus was largely on national
and multinational actors who were largely perceived to be “the
only game in town.”59 The problem with climate change at that
scale is, however, the continued lack of effective, promising
action. The Kyoto Protocol only called for at least 5% GHG
reductions by Annex I nations under the first commitment
period;60 not nearly enough to effectively stem climate change
according to current data.61 And although the Kyoto Protocol
was extended from 2012 to 2020 at the 2012 Conference of
Parties (COP 18) in Doha,62 only 37 out of the 191 parties to the
UNFCCC now have legally binding emissions limitations and
reduction commitments, representing only about 15% of global
emissions.63 The Kyoto Protocol now mainly applies to the
58. Id. at 58.
59. Thomas Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change
Adaptation at the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, 1229 (2011).
60. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162.
61. See supra Part II.A.
62. Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Draft Decision,
8th Sess., Nov. 26, 2012–Dec. 7, 2012, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9
(Dec. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments];
Ban Welcomes Outcome of UN Climate Change Talks in Doha, UNITED
NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=43716#.UMjE1454VW4.
63. Ban Welcomes Outcome of UN Climate Change Talks in Doha, supra
note 62; Karl Ritter & Michael Casey, UN Climate Conference: Kyoto Protocol
Extended at Doha, Qatar Talks, HUFFINGTON POST (DEC. 8, 2012, 4:33 AM),
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European Union (EU), Australia, and a few other countries who
can choose their own emission targets.64 Previous
industrialized signatories Japan, Russia, and Canada did not
sign on to the extension.65 The United States signed but never
ratified the Kyoto Protocol.66 Cautious hopes before Doha had
been for a newly strengthened and legally binding agreement
that would also apply to developing countries such as China
and India, the world’s top and third largest carbon emitters,
respectively.67 But at a time when the Kyoto Protocol should
have been strengthened, it was left significantly weakened,
although officially still alive.68 And although a “rough work
plan” attempts to pave the way for a comprehensive, legally
binding agreement by 2015, it would only take effect in 2020;
years after carbon emissions should already have peaked.69
After the Copenhagen, Durban, and Doha UNFCCC
negotiations, there is thus—for good reason—wide and deep
skepticism regarding the efficacy of large-scale international
solutions to be implemented through national actors.70
At the regional level, the EU has adopted relatively farreaching climate change reduction commitments—“cutting its
emissions to 20% below 1990 levels” by 202071—but has
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/08/un-climate-conference-kyoto-dohaqatar_n_2262371.html.
64. Tom Arup, Doha Climate Change Talks Delivered Little, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/dohaclimate-change-talks-delivered-little-20121210-2b5oj.html.
65. Id.
66. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCC, http://unfccc.int/
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Mar. 23,
2012); Michael A. Fletcher & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Proposes Talks on
Warming, WASH. POST (May 31, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/31/AR2007053100934.html (“Bush refused to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which required industrialized nations to bring
greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2012, calling the plan -- which
excluded many fast-growing countries such as India and China -unworkable.”).
67. Gopal Sharma, India Says is Now Third Highest Carbon Emitter,
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2010, 9:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/
04/us-india-climate-idUSTRE6932PE20101004.
68. Stephen Leahy, Doha Climate Summit Ends with No New CO2 Cuts
or Funding, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 10, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://truth-out.org/news/
item/13254-doha-climate-summit-ends-with-no-new-co2-cuts-or-funding.
69. Arup, supra note 64.
70. See Ritter & Casey, supra note 63.
71. What is the EU Doing About Climate Change?, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 7,

DELLINGER_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/8/2013 10:00 AM

LOCALIZING CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION

615

admitted that because the EU is a relatively small group of
emitters covering at the very most 14% of global emissions, it is
not by itself going to make a significant difference in the fight
against climate change.72 As for the largest emitters, the
United States has only pledged to reduce its emissions by 17%
below 2005 levels, but has never adopted any legally binding
agreement at a national level.73 Further, the United States
stated early on in the Doha negotiations that it would not
increase its 17%-by-2020 target because “the scale and extent
of [the United States’] effort . . . [is] enormous.”74 Similarly, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has only recently
begun developing standards for GHG emissions from stationary
and mobile sources, which will have some positive effect75 but
likely not soon enough.76 China and India are still claiming a
right to emit a significant amount of the total, although not per
capita, amount of GHGs in order to develop and modernize.77
Finger-pointing, passing the hot potato, and procrastination
are still the name of the game at the national and
supranational levels and may still be so for some time to come;
time that just is not available if we want to avoid what experts
fear will be extreme results.78 There is thus broad agreement
among legal scholars that the international treaty regime and
national action is currently not leading to effective progress
against climate change.79
Since the national and international climate change
regimes are at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently,
2013).
72. Ritter, supra note 29.
73. Karl Ritter, UN Climate Boss: No Support for Tough Climate Deal,
YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 30, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/un-climate-boss-nosupport-tough-climate-deal-123816100.html.
74. US Defends “Enormous” Climate Efforts at UN Talks, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162-57554338/u.s-defendsenormous-climate-efforts-at-u.n-talks/.
75. What
is
EPA
Doing
About
Climate
Change?,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2013).
76. See supra Part II.A.
77. Peter Singer, A Fair Deal on Climate Change, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(June 10, 2007), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-fair-deal-onclimate-change.
78. See supra Part II.A.
79. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?
Litigations’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 600 (2009) (“The
international legal regime suffers from both a lack of political will and the
complexities of national implementation.”).
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dysfunctional, there is a clear need for action by lower-level
structures. Whereas possible solutions at the scaled-up level
would add to the picture, they are no longer considered “the
only game in town”;80 in fact, quite far from it. A rapidly
growing body of scholarship points to the emergence of a range
of sub-state actors who are developing their own initiatives and
approaches to climate change action.81 In one study, for
example, more sub-states than actual states were taking
climate change initiatives: out of fifty-eight experiments, only
nine were nation states.82 Localized action is thus overtaking
the importance of national and supranational climate change
law. The next Part will analyze some such drivers of action.
III. LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE EXPERIMENTS
New actors at both the local government and nongovernmental levels are surfacing and becoming the focus of
attention in the climate change field.83 Because of the
established lack of effective action by traditional actors, it is
worth examining these non-traditional actors to examine
whether they can be considered to be able to produce viable
alternatives to more traditional action or whether they just add
to an already increasingly fragmented, yet largely ineffective,
climate governance system.84 For purposes of limitation, the
focus of this article will be on action taken by select nonemissions trading programs at the subnational level only. As
one of the purposes of this article is to determine if scaled-down
action within climate change may already have or promise to
take on any legally binding nature where legally binding
solutions at the national and supranational levels have largely
failed to surface, the main focus of this article will focus on
initiatives that voluntarily feature at least some mandatory
aspects, broadly interpreted. Thus, the article will analyze
80. Cf. Gremillion, supra note 59, at 1229 (quoting John Gummer)
(defending the Kyoto Protocol as the “only game in town”).
81. See, e.g., Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the
Governance of Climate Change: What is the Role of Law in Cities?, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 315 (2009).
82. MATTHEW J. HOFFMAN, CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS:
EXPERIMENTING WITH A GLOBAL RESPONSE AFTER KYOTO 30–31 (2011).
83. See, e.g., STEINER ANDRESEN & LARS H. GULBRANDSEN, FRIDTJOF
NANSEN INST., THE ROLE OF GREEN NGOS IN PROMOTING CLIMATE
COMPLIANCE (2003), available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/rapp0403.pdf.
84. See supra Part II.C.
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initiatives that apply “strict” accountability with traditional
enforcement, programs with broader forms of accountability
but no strict enforcement, and models with reporting
requirements and regulatory implications but no enforcement
per se. For comparison of possible efficiencies, however, some
promising city coalition programs without any enforcement will
also be analyzed.
A. EXPERIMENTS WITH TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT METHODS
The two initiatives analyzed below feature enforcement
mechanisms under which actors are held strictly accountable if
failing to meet their self-imposed but binding commitments.
One experiment employs monetary fines, and the other
employs expulsion from group membership for compliance
failures. Such enforcement mechanisms more closely resemble
traditional forms of compliance securement than some of the
newer, collaborative experiments that will be analyzed later.
Because the purpose of this article is to predict the possible
future efficacy of non-traditional, local climate change
experiments, the article does not critique the chosen degree of
severity, or possible lack thereof, of the sanctions chosen by
each initiative. The interesting aspects of the actual steps
taken are to consider whether they might lead to any effect at
all, not whether other types or degrees of sanctioning may be
more effective than those chosen. Both the potential for
procedural and substantive efficacies will be analyzed.
1. EU Covenant of Mayors
Urban activity is associated with “80% of energy
consumption and CO2 emissions.”85 Against this background,
the European Commission launched the Covenant of Mayors
(Covenant) in 2008 to endorse and support the efforts deployed
by local authorities to reduce their contributions to climate
change.86 Covenant signatories aim to meet and exceed the
EU’s target of 20% CO2 reductions by 2020.87 Some signatories
voluntarily go much further than that. For example, the city of
Halmstad, Sweden, has adopted a 45% reduction goal.88
85. The Covenant of Mayors, COVENANT MAYORS, http://www.
eumayors.eu/about/covenant-of-mayors_en.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. MUNICIPALITY OF HALMSTAD, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN:
STRATEGIC DOCUMENT FOR A SUSTAINABLE CONVERSION OF ENERGY IN
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Through these goals, local authorities would contribute as
much as one fifth of the total emissions reductions effort
needed for the whole EU.89
The Covenant is open to democratically constituted cities,
whatever their stage of implementation of their existing energy
and climate policies.90 Currently, the Covenant has no less than
4,392 signatories representing over 168 million inhabitants.91
Whereas the Covenant was initially open only to cities in
Europe, it now offers membership to cities around the world.92
Thus, in addition to the many EU members, numerous non-EU
local authorities have joined the initiative including cities such
as Buenos Aires, Argentina; Lviv, Ukraine; Osh, Kyrgyzstan;
Fornelli, Cameroon; and Ushaia, Argentina, the southernmost
city in the world.93
The signatory cities plan to go beyond the objectives set by
the EU through the use of individualized Sustainable Energy
Action Plans (SEAPs) with follow-up implementation reports,
by adapting city structures “in order to undertake necessary
actions,” by mobilizing civil society to take part in developing
the SEAPs, and by sharing “experience and know-how with
other territorial units.”94 The action taken must cover at least
three of the Covenant’s four key sectors: transportation;
municipal buildings; tertiary buildings, equipment and
facilities; and residential buildings.95
If the CO2 reduction objectives set forth in the SEAP are
not met, or if an SEAP is not submitted within the year
following formal city adoption of the Covenant, the cities will be
HALMSTAD FOR 2010–2014, at 5 (2011), available at http://helpdesk.
eumayors.eu/docs/seap/714_1329817723.pdf.
89. COVENANT OF MAYORS, TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE 4 (2011)
available
at
[hereinafter
TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE],
http://www.eumayors.eu/IMG/pdf/brochure_com_web_FINAL_18_11_2011.pdf.
90. As a Local Authority, COVENANT MAYORS, http://www.eumayors.eu/
participation/as-a-local-authority_en.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). If cities
are too small to prepare a GHG inventory or draft an action plan, they “should
be supported by administrations who can.” COVENANT OF MAYORS, COVENANT
OF MAYORS 4 (2008), available at http://www.eumayors.eu/IMG/pdf/
covenantofmayors_text_en.pdf.
MAYORS, http://www.eumayors.eu/index_en.html (last
91. COVENANT
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
92. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 9.
93. Id.
94. As a Local Authority, supra note 90, at 2.
95. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 5.
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terminated from program membership.96 “Signatories who fail
to fulfill their commitments are temporarily suspended from
the initiative until they can prove otherwise. In addition, the
actual implementation of the SEAP is ensured by the biannual
submission of a monitoring report.”97
What motivates cities to undertake this type of
commitment? Public relations are important. The cities are
given a perceivably significant opportunity to make a public
statement of extra commitments to CO2 reductions and thus to
make their territories known as pioneers in climate change
reduction efforts.98 Shared expertise, as well as the
opportunities to benefit from EU endorsement and support,
also factor in.99 Further, members may also qualify for various
types of funding through the initiative.100
According to the EU Commissioner for Climate, Ms.
Connie Hedegaard, more than 2300 local authorities have
already gone beyond the 2020 targets before the adopted
deadline.101 This, of course, is significant. It is thus fair to label
action at this level substantively successful, at least under the
EU Covenant umbrella. It is also procedurally promising in
that the program motivates a greater and greater number of
local authorities and their private-citizen constituents to take
joint action in developing and implementing action plans.
2. Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGs)
The CRAG initiative began in England. CRAGs are
composed of groups of private individuals who have committed
to reducing their individual and collective carbon footprints.102
“[T]he core idea behind CRAGs is that personal responsibility is
key, and that lobbying the government is only half of the
solution.”103 CRAGs have been compared to “Weight-Watchers

96. As a Local Authority, supra note 90, at 2.
97. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 5.
98. As a Local Authority, supra note 90.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 3.
102. Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization
of Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87, 115–16 (2012).
103. Jamie Andrews, A Rational Approach to Carbon, ECOLOGIST, Nov.
2008, at 40, 40.
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for the energy-conscious.”104 The aims of CRAG schemes are:
1. To make us all aware of our personal CO2 footprint
2. To find out if it can help us make radical cuts in our personal CO2
emissions
3. To help us argue for (or against!) the adoption of similar schemes at
a national (DTQ) and/or international (C&C) [Contraction and
Convergence] level
4. To build up solidarity between a growing community of carbon
conscious people
5. To share practical lower-carbon-living knowledge and experience105

In the United Kingdom (UK), there are as many as twenty
active CRAGs with established rules and at least one carbon
accounting year underway, as well as eleven start-ups that are
still recruiting members or have not yet determined rules or
started a carbon accounting year.106 In the United States, there
are four established CRAGs and two startups.107 In Canada,
one established CRAG and one startup exist, and China has
one established CRAG.108 It should be noted that it is
questionable whether all of these experiments are still truly
active or not, and if so, what their level of activity is.109 In fact,
some CRAG members have expressed doubt about whether
their respective CRAGs are still fully functioning.110 Key
members are examining strategies “to help the movement grow
and continue to flourish.”111 At any rate, the CRAG scheme is
worth briefly considering to glean the lessons that were, after
all, produced even if the CRAG scheme has since stalled in
some instances or to some extent.
A CRAG consists of approximately 250–350 members.112
The CRAGs either set an annual emissions target (a ration) in
total amounts; for example, five metric tons of CO2 per person
or a percentage-based cut in emissions compared to the
previous year.113 Most British groups with a per capita target
Id. at 42.
HOWELL, supra note 30, at 3.
Krakoff, supra note 102, at 117.
Id.
Id.
HOWELL, supra note 30, at 4.
Id.
Andrews, supra note 103, at 43.
HOWELL, supra note 30, at 4.
Carbon Equity: What is a Carbon Rationing Group, CLIMATE ACTION
CENTER, http://web.archive.org/web/20120618135932/http://climateactioncen
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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started with 4500 kilograms, an approximately 10% per annum
reduction of the UK average for direct emissions.114 The
rationale was that a 10% per annum reduction is what is
needed to cut emissions by 90% by 2030, which is the UK’s fair
share of the global reduction necessary to avoid warming of
more than 2ºC.115 Most CRAGs operate with a target that is the
same for each member at a certain emissions level; for example,
a “25% reduction per year for those who start with a footprint
of 15–20 tonnes, down to a 5% reduction for those who start
with a footprint of 5 tonnes or lower.”116 Some CRAGs have
differentiated obligations and some allow members to set their
own targets.117 Some do not have a fixed ration at all.118
Members keep track of their own emissions by keeping a record
of household energy use and private car and plane travel.119
The most noteworthy aspect of the CRAG initiative is that
many of the groups impose penalties on noncompliant members
without government mandates requiring such enforcement.120
This self-imposition of traditional rule enforcement by nongovernmental groups is unique in the climate change
framework.121 While national and supranational bodies still
discuss whether any future schemes should be legally
enforceable and, if so, how to implement such enforcement,
these groups have already voluntarily taken on mechanisms
with quasi-legal ramifications, thus showing a lack of
opposition to traditionally styled norm enforcement in the
climate change context, at least by some members of civil
society.122
The predominant design of the CRAG enforcement system
is based on financial penalties.123 Of the active CRAGs listed in

tre.org/carbon-equity (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Carbon Equity].
114. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 10.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Carbon Equity, supra note 113.
120. See HOWELL, supra note 30, at 1–4; Andrews, supra note 103, at 40;
Carbon Equity, supra note 113.
121. See generally Andrews, supra note 103, at 40–43 (describing CRAGs
and highlighting their unique structure).
122. See generally Andrews, supra note 103, at 43 (“CRAGs is a practical
implementation of a well-researched policy . . . . We are testing it out and
seeing how it works in practice.” (quoting David Bassendine)).
123. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 13.
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one report, fourteen have a financial penalty for exceeding the
carbon target, ranging from two pence to ten pence per
kilogram.124 Many groups cap the penalty at £100 per year and
“[t]wo CRAGs allow over-emitters to do voluntary work in lieu
of paying the financial penalty.”125 Seven CRAGs chose not to
have a penalty at all.126 Only two CRAGs operate a carbon
“trading” scheme, “where under-emitters receive payments
from over-emitters.”127 Instead, six CRAGS give monies “from
over-emitters to carbon reduction projects, environmental
charities, or other ‘good causes.’”128 A few have yet to decide
what to do with the penalties paid by the over-emitters, but
appear to be considering funding carbon offsetting projects or
environmental groups instead of financially rewarding underemitters.129 Finally, not all CRAG participants (CRAGers)
attribute the changes in their carbon consumption patterns to
their involvement with the CRAG scheme.130 Although some do
not so connect their behavioral patterns to CRAG involvement,
the mere fact that they are members of a CRAG has doubtlessly
had an effect on their thinking, which is significant too.
The psychology of penalties in the carbon context is
relevant to considerations of whether action of this nature and
at this level has the potential for being substantively
efficient.131 First, many CRAGers did not think that the
financial penalty applied had actually changed their carbon
consuming behavior, in part because the penalties are too
small.132 One person said about a potentially larger penalty: “It
would focus my mind. I wouldn’t be content to just let things
drift and think if it’s a little bit I’ll pay. I would have to actually
sit down and work it out and that would be good.”133
The embarrassment factor should also be considered: some
people feel embarrassed about receiving money from fellow
CRAGers, but not from larger, unknown sources.134 Thus, just
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 5, 14–16.
Id. at 14–15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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over 50% of the interviewees in one study expressed “qualified
to enthusiastic” support for the introduction of a national
personal carbon accounting scheme in the UK.135 One of the
main reasons for such support is that a national plan would
still take the form of a redistributive policy, but one in which
the incentive is having to pay money to a large and relatively
anonymous entity rather than gaining money from a small
group whose members more closely identify with one
another.136 The embarrassment factor is not perceived as being
a barrier in a national scheme because, as one CRAGer stated,
“[T]here wouldn’t be this ‘I’m doing it to you my neighbour’ sort
of factor.”137
So far, a few CRAGs have been able to create some
substantively promising results. Members of some groups
reduced their footprints by 27%, from 4.9 tonnes to 3.6 tonnes,
just in their first year of membership.138 The 3.6 metric tons
footprint is 31% below the UK average of 5.2 metric ton for
direct carbon emissions.139 The average baseline footprint of
CRAGers was only “6% below the UK average.”140 Thus, the
members were not already at a significant advantage or
disadvantage when starting.141
It is important to consider what motivates individuals to
comply with mandates that have been imposed on them from
the top down or that they have imposed upon themselves in
order to attempt to identify the most promising solutions for
possible future program emulation. The motivation to observe
binding mandates comes in many forms.142 Financial and other
traditional, adversarial style penalties are just few of several
Equally
important
are
possibly
effective
drivers.143
considerations such as: (1) whether the mandates or laws are
seen as sound and necessary from both a personal and social
point of view, (2) whether they have been adopted with public
participation by trustworthy bodies of authority, and (3)
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id. at 18–19.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See generally id. at 8–9 (discussing the variety of motives that lead
individuals to join CRAGs).
143. See id. at 13–17 (discussing the many approaches to incentivize
attaining one’s own carbon reduction goal taken by various CRAGs).
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whether they are considered important symbolically as a
statement of the direction in which constituents and
stakeholders should move.144
In the CRAG context, this means that it may actually not
be the penalties that motivate members to reduce their carbon
emissions. It may just as well be that CRAGers—who by
definition are highly environmentally conscious people145—
believe in the soundness of reducing carbon emissions to begin
with, and would thus have been just as or almost just as likely
to act even without a financial deterrent.146 Although it is
difficult to separate just one motivation from a possible
multitude of causes leading to any given desired effect, it is still
important to monitor whether experiments with strict
accountability and penalties for excessive carbon emissions
will, over time, lead to more comprehensive and promising
patterns of carbon reduction than comparable groups without
traditional enforcement mechanisms.
It is also important to remember that it cannot be assumed
that the experiences of some CRAGers will expand to the
general population as a whole, in the UK, or elsewhere, should
a national, compulsory, personal carbon accounting scheme be
instigated; CRAGers still only represent a limited segment of
the general population. However, their results do suggest some
interesting issues to consider. For example, whether fixed
carbon rations or targets may prove viable, how carbon
accounting should be accomplished, and what type of
enforcement methods should be applied to subnational or
national rationing initiatives, if any.
In sum, the CRAG model appears relevant to climate
change efforts, but only as an addition to broader schemes. This
is mainly because doubt exists as to whether these groups are
truly active anymore and, if so, whether any significant work is
being undertaken under the CRAG umbrella.147 If CRAGs
144. For more information on the recognized advantages of public
participation, see Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21–29).
145. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 7 (“In general, the CRAGers interviewed
could be informally described (and some did describe themselves) as ‘the usual
green suspects.’”).
146. Id. at 7–9 (detailing CRAGers’ motivations for involvement—many of
which were based in environmentally conscientious ideals).
147. See id. at 4 (“[M]embers of two of [the twenty-four active UK CRAGs]
expressed doubt when interviewed about whether their CRAG was still
functioning.”).
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reappear as active, fully legitimate actors in the climate change
arena, it would become relevant to continue attempting to
verify whether the members take action because of the model or
whether they would have done so anyway for personally
convincing reasons. It would also be necessary to follow up on
the efficacy of self-imposed penalties on group members.
Whereas action scaled down to the purely individual,
voluntary micro-level thus appear to be largely insufficient as a
stand-alone model at this point in time,148 some important
lessons can still be derived from the CRAG initiative. First,
clear information,149 targets,150 and intergroup support151 are a
must at this level of action. Second, differentiated
responsibilities are needed allowing members to individualize
their carbon rationing goals,152 at least within some parameters
and to some extent. Third, flexibility and dynamism are key.153
Accordingly, whereas on the one hand carbon reduction targets
should be clear, the supervising authorities (whether nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or government entities)
should, on the other hand, consider the benefits of granting
participants some leeway in meeting the targets while still
upholding clear overall goals to drive the action forward. This
is a fine balance to strike, but an important one. Fourth, having
sanctions may be more substantively effective than having
none.154 If sanctions are monetary in nature, payments and
transfers of funds should be overseen by bodies of more
traditional authority, such as governments or larger, more
established groups than smaller NGOs such as CRAGs. This is
because of the embarrassment factor mentioned above.155 In
148. See id. at 26–28 (discussing the limitations of CRAGs).
149. See id. at 17–18 (highlighting the value of increased information
regarding personal emission levels).
150. See id. at 10–11 (showcasing the role of a variety of target-setting
methods within CRAGs).
151. See id. at 23–26 (discussing the significance of the group aspect of
CRAGs).
152. See generally id. at 35 (highlighting the issue of how much of an
allowance to give to households with children as an example of the necessary
tailoring of CRAG approaches).
153. Andrews, supra note 103, at 42 (“CRAGs let individuals chose their
own path to carbon reduction . . . . That flexibility is key to the group
dynamic.” (quoting CRAG member, Guy Shrubsole)).
154. Cf. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 13 (“Of the 24 ‘active’ CRAGs listed on
the website, 14 definitely have a financial penalty for exceeding the carbon
target . . . .”).
155. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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general, the peer pressure factor does appear to instigate action
at the scaled-down level. For example, one CRAGer stated:
If one group member feels the need to take a flight for a particular
reason others in the group can effectively sanction it by ensuring that
the group target is not exceeded. This is an important concept to
explore given that climate change affects us all, no matter who is
responsible for the carbon being released into the atmosphere.156

Last, but not least, bottom-up action is widely considered
necessary to successful climate change efforts.157 By their very
nature, CRAGs demonstrate how such action may spring forth
at the very bottom of traditional law- and policy-development
hierarchies.158 This low level of action is not one typically
looked to for action and may not yield sufficient substantive
progress without the synergic effects that can be obtained
through an interface to other larger-scaled areas of action,159
but procedurally, CRAGs have added value to the
environmental discourse.160
B. EXPERIMENTING WITH COLLABORATIVE ENFORCEMENT
METHODS
This section analyzes Climate Savers, an initiative with no
traditional adversarial-style enforcement mechanisms.161
Instead, this initiative features accountability in the form of
monitoring and independent verification combined with
secondary implementation requirements.162 This type of
enforcement is more collaborative than traditional approaches
with more authoritative and, in some cases, even adversarial
approaches.163 It is also one promoted in and applied in some
156. Andrews, supra note 103, at 42 (emphasis added).
157. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 24).
158. See Andrews, supra note 103, at 40.
159. See generally HOWELL, supra note 30, at 33.
160. See generally Andrews, supra note 103, at 43 (discussing the current
value and potential future of CRAGs).
161. WWF CLIMATE SAVERS, DISCOVER THE BENEFITS OF LEADERSHIP
WITH WWF CLIMATE SAVERS 5–9 (2012) [hereinafter DISCOVER THE
BENEFITS], available at http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/461/files/
original/A5_brochure_Climate_Savers_120701.pdf?1348776926.
162. See WWF Climate Savers Companies Cut 100 Million Tonnes of
Greenhouse Gases, WWF (May 9, 2012), http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/
?204638/WWF-Climate-Savers-companies-cut-100-million-tonnes-ofgreenhouse-gases [hereinafter WWF Climate Savers Companies].
163. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 5 (“The process begins
with a consultation between the prospective member company and an
independent technical expert. Together, we explore what it would entail for
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environmental treaty contexts such as the Facilitative Branch
of the UNFCCC and the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe Aarhus Convention.164
Climate Savers is a World Wildlife Fund (WWF)-run
platform for corporations wishing to undertake voluntary
sector-leading targets regarding their own GHG emissions as
well as to cooperate with other companies in the
implementation of innovative solutions for a low carbon
economy.165 Climate Savers started as a two-year experiment
meant mainly to be an advocacy tool, but is now “one of the
most ambitious and credible climate business engagement
programmes in the world.”166 Members include established
corporate giants such as Nike, Johnson & Johnson, IBM, Novo
Nordisk, and Sony.167
The members set their own reductions goals tailored to the
specific circumstances and operating sector of each member
company.168 The goals are set in absolute terms for defined
timeframes.169 Climate Savers writes a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) for the participants, who commit
themselves in writing to an action plan.170 If that plan cannot
be implemented, a secondary action plan will be drafted.171 The
program uses what is known as “stretch targets,” under which
companies undertake reductions goals that go a few
percentages further than that with which the companies are
comfortable.172 This is done in order to challenge the companies
to not just meet, but to exceed even their own expectations and
comfort levels.173 The MOU is written by the WWF and
stipulates that Climate Savers will issue a public statement
about the compliance challenges and an action plan to remedy
any gaps that may arise.174 Compliance review is conducted by
your company to be sector-leading in carbon efficiency and how your company
can go beyond its existing or previously planned emission reduction targets.”).
164. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 45–46).
165. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 3.
166. Id. at 5; Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, Senior Program
Officer, Climate Change, WWF US (June 27, 2012).
167. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 11.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Email from Matthew Banks, Senior Program Officer, Climate Change,
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the independent third party Ecofys.175
The goals are publicly communicated and will result in
pressure to comply from the global community.176 Among other
things, the companies have to report progress every year at a
global summit in front of their peers, adding pressure to
comply.177 The members’ relationship with Climate Savers is,
however, non-adversarial and there are no penalties for noncompliance.178 This type of oversight and public awareness is
thus not unlike the “naming and shaming” enforcement method
already known in international law contexts, although typically
one that is used against nation states, not private actors as
here.179
What drives the participants to undertake relatively farreaching goals such as those under the Climate Savers program
even without government requirements? A noteworthy aspect
of this program is that the commonly perceived public relations
advantage of being seen as “green” does not motivate all
companies to act. According to Senior Program Officer Matthew
Banks, the members participate mainly out of a sense of
obligation.180 They do not want to be associated with the
negative tenets of environmentalism such as the BP and
“greenwashing” scandals of recent years.181 This counters the
otherwise common criticism that companies are more
interested in the public relations advantages to be derived from
carbon reduction efforts than in any substantive results. This
may well be the case for some, but as shown, it does not hold
true for all. Among other motivational factors are strong and
positive brand images, increased networking opportunities,
improved business performance through energy savings, and

WWF US, to Myanna Dellinger, Assistant Professor of Law, W. State Coll. of
Law (June 27, 2012) (on file with author); Email from Matthew Banks, Senior
Program Officer, Climate Change, WWF US, to Myanna Dellinger, Assistant
Professor of Law, W. State Coll. of Law (Dec. 14, 2012) (on file with author).
175. WWF Climate Savers Companies, supra note 162.
176. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166.
177. Email from Matthew Banks, supra note 174.
178. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166.
179. Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt, International Organizations and
Government Killings: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?, 38 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 1, 2 (2012) (defining naming and shaming as “policy of
punishment by publicity”).
180. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166.
181. Id.
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improved risk management through reduced energy
dependence.182 These companies also recognize that “cutting
carbon emissions and spurring economic growth can go hand in
hand.”183 Further, the program acts as a “sounding board,
providing valuable guidance for companies seeking to
substantially reduce their carbon footprints while growing their
businesses and enhancing their brand equity.”184
The collaborative enforcement methodology of the program
can also be measured against notions of corporate social
responsibility, pursuant to which some companies just might
act because it is the “right” thing to do.185 In this context,
carbon reduction action is undoubtedly not only taken for the
sake of acting in what is modernly perceived to be
environmentally sound ways, but also driven by interests in
reducing energy consumption to save money. This is partly
because corporations realize that government regulations are
inevitable in the long run anyway, and for fears of potential
government or shareholder lawsuits for failure to act
reasonably in an area in which the law is undergoing change in
directions that are not yet fully predictable. One stakeholder
said, “It doesn’t actually matter whether a board believes in
climate change, ‘cos [sic] climate change believes in them and
they have no choice but to ensure that they are seen to be
taking effective action on climate change.”186 Thus, whereas
some corporations claim that they are not taking action
because of any perceived public relations advantages, it is clear
that for others, the perceived negative implications of noncompliance is a factor in program compliance.
It is fair to describe Climate Savers as a success. By May
2012, member companies have cut 100 million tonnes of GHGs
in direct and indirect emissions, which corresponds to twice the
current annual emissions of Switzerland.187 One example of
effects reached through the program is Johnson & Johnson.
This company’s “climate change goal was to reduce its baseline
182. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 6–7.
183. Id. at 3.
184. Id.
185. For more information about why civil society observes norms that are
considered morally sound, although perhaps not mandated by positive law, see
Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–8).
186. Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the
Governance of Climate Change: What is the Role of Law in Cities?, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 340–41 (2009).
187. WWF Climate Savers Companies, supra note 162.

DELLINGER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

630

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/8/2013 10:00 AM

[Vol. 14:2

1990 CO2 emission levels [for its facilities] by 7 percent by the
end of 2010.”188 When that target was initially adopted, the
company considered it very hard to reach. Nonetheless, the
company not only achieved, but exceeded the goal by achieving
a 23% reduction at the end of 2010.189 Simultaneously, the
company experienced a sales growth of approximately 450%.190
At the end of 2011, Johnson & Johnson realized a more modest
4.9% reduction in CO2 emissions while still realizing a 5.5%
increase in sales.191 In regards to its transportation-related
emissions, the company has announced two related goals: a
five-year goal of reducing the CO2 emissions to 142
grams/kilometer per vehicle, which it is on track to achieve,192
and to realize a 20% improvement in its overall fleet emissions
efficiency for its global inventory of over 28,000 vehicles.193 For
its overall energy use, however, the company states only that it
“will continue to follow The Greenhouse Gas Protocol issued by
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and
the World Resources Institute” whose goals are not
transparent.194 Other companies, although not members of
Climate Savers, have also managed to reduce energy
consumption in tough financial times (perhaps precisely
because of such times). As two examples, “Dow Chemical has
decreased its energy costs $9 billion since 1994,”195 and
“Walmart has increased the fuel efficiency of its distribution
fleet by 69% since 2005.”196 There is thus reason for cautious
optimism that some companies will proactively and voluntarily
seek to reduce their emissions without traditional legal
requirements.
188. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, 2011 RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 29 (2011),
available at http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/e265d6804bc83ae392f6ffbf
30c50c56 /2011-responsibilty-report.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 31.
193. Id. at 30.
194. Id. at 29. The emission reduction goals of this program are not clear,
which casts some doubt on the ultimate willingness of the participating
corporate members in taking effective action and not just reiterating more or
less empty rhetoric. See About the GHG Protocol, GREENHOUSE GAS
PROTOCOL, http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp (last visited Feb. 13, 2013)
(describing the GHG Protocol).
195. Winston, supra note 3.
196. Id.
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The Climate Savers initiative shows several important
aspects of non-governmental action against climate change
under the auspices of an established, reputable organization.
First, strict oversight by a third party of claims of
environmental advances by corporations is needed to avoid
“greenwashing” or the appearances thereof. Of course, it is
impossible to prevent companies from producing selfinterested, yet largely untrue promotional statements to boost
their image and sales.197 It is precisely for this reason that
membership of and accountability through organizations such
as Climate Savers is an advantage both to those companies
that actually intend to take relevant action and to the outside
world. Strict or traditional enforcement of organizational goals
may actually not be needed to ensure goal compliance; softer
oversight methods with assistance in reaching the adopted
goals may be equally effective. Considerations of public
relations are still key in this context as shown both by the
interest of some in being seen as part of the green movement
and, similarly but for the opposite reason, the interest of some
in not being associated with that movement because of recent
perceived, although arguably not always factually correct,
scandals rocking the environmental movement.
Of course, the most important issue in the corporate
context is not so much whether some companies actually mean
well and truly intend to reduce their carbon footprints, whether
for purely financial or for more altruistic reasons, but that the
traditional carbon industry is still able to counteract much of
the carbon reductions achieved by other companies through the
sheer size of the industry’s planned carbon output as described
above.198 The carbon industry is virtually out of government
control at the global level. This situation is untenable and must
be turned around if we as a world society are truly serious
about finding solutions to climate change.199 It is beyond the
scope of this article and almost impossible to answer the
question of just how to do so. However, it is still encouraging
that initiatives such as Climate Savers are able to work
197. For example, in 2012, BP ran commercials on national televised news
stations still boasting the company’s alleged interest in the environment years
after having caused one of the worst oil drilling disasters in history. See Cain
Burdeau, BP Ad Campaign Following Gulf Oil Spill Deemed ‘Propaganda’ by
Some, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/01/08/bp-ad-campaign-gulf-oil-_n_1192600.html.
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. See supra Part II.A.
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productively with other corporations if not the carbon industry
for obvious reasons. In short, action on many fronts is required.
It is fair to conclude that Climate Savers sets a promising
precedent for companies willing to undertake voluntary, but
quasi-binding action.
C. VOLUNTARY EXPERIMENTS
The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection
Agreement (MCPA) and the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives’s (ICLEI) GreenClimateCities
initative create contrast to programs with a more binding
nature such as the EU Covenant of Mayors. These two
voluntary programs are, in particular, relevant in this context
as both they and the Covenant are city coalition programs. But
whereas the Covenant appears to be both procedurally and
substantively successful,200 more action needs to be
demonstrated by the MCPA and GreenClimateCities before
these can reasonably be determined to be effective in both
aspects as well.
1. MCPA
The MCPA has been ratified by 1,054 mayors from cities in
all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico,
representing a total population of almost 90 million people.201
The program was launched by then Seattle Mayor Greg Nichols
in 2005 on the date on which the Kyoto Protocol took legal
effect for the ratifying nations.202
Under the MCPA, participating cities have committed to
take the following three actions:
- Strive to meet or beat the [2012] Kyoto Protocol targets in their own
communities, through actions ranging from anti-sprawl land-use

200. See supra Part III.A.1.
201. List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
However, a map of participating cities show significant clustering around
traditionally progressive urban areas such as San Francisco, Seattle, Portland,
and other large metropolitan areas. Cities That Have Signed On, MAYORS
CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
ClimateChange.asp (last updated Feb. 12, 2013).
202. U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, MAYORS
CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
agreement.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
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policies to urban forest restoration projects to public information
campaigns;
- Urge their state governments, and the federal government, to enact
policies and programs to meet or beat the greenhouse gas emission
reduction target suggested for the United States in the Kyoto Protocol
--[a] 7% reduction from 1990 levels by 2012; and
- Urge the U.S. Congress to pass the [sic] bipartisan greenhouse gas
reduction legislation, which would establish a national emission
trading system203

Although the initiative thus refers to “commitments,” it
features no enforcement mechanisms and thus no ramifications
for noncompliance.204 The program is entirely voluntary.205
To sign up for the MCPA, mayors have to sign a simple
one-page “agreement” simply stating, “You have my support for
the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement” with the possibility
for adding comments that will be posted on the website.206
Although simplicity in drafting agreements can be good, too
much simplicity can also be seen as a lack of a genuine interest
in reaching the ultimate goal, namely GHG emissions
reductions that can prevent dangerous climate change.
Further, because the 7% target to be reached is substantively
highly limited, especially as knowledge has cemented in recent
years that reductions need to be tenfold that of the initial
MCPA “commitment,” the MCPA’s outcome-relevance has
dwindled in spite of at least some early promise for potential.207
This is arguably aggravated by the fact that the agreement
features no enforcement or apparent accountability.208 Today,
the MCPA thus appears to have become more of a political
public relations tool than an agreement with much real
“bite.”209
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Telephone Interview with Kevin McCarty, Managing Dir., MCPA
(Aug. 7, 2012).
205. Id.
206. The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement—
Signature Page, USMAYORS.ORG, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
documents/signaturepage.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. Cf. U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra
note 202.
209. Compare supra text accompanying note 203 (explaining the goals of
the MCPA), with supra Part II.A (noting necessary emissions reductions). It
should be kept in mind that emissions reductions of approximately 5% was the
goal discussed under the UNFCCC regime at the time the MCPA was adopted.
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162. However, it soon became
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Although the participating mayors have “recognize[d] the
need for a federal partner in this effort [and] they cannot and
will not wait to act until Washington is ready to move on this
problem,” the MCPA website does not provide any updates as
to any substantively significant results or even any recent
general updates.210 Although it is difficult to prove a negative,
one is inclined to assume that if the organization’s members
had been able to meet or exceed their targets, such results
would have been announced through the program, especially
given the initial interest by the members in the potential for
public relations benefits via the MCPA.
2. ICLEI and the GreenClimateCities Initiative
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability—counts
among its members “12 mega-cities, 100 super-cities and urban
regions, 450 large cities as well as 450 medium-sized cities and
towns in 84 countries.”211 ICLEI was the first global network of
cities and local governments established to achieve
sustainability at the local level.212 ICLEI’s 1991 “Urban CO2
Reduction Project[] implemented in 14 cities across the U[nited]
S[tates], Europe and Canada, was [among] the first concrete
measure[s] in local climate action.”213 Under ICLEI’s initial
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign, participating
cities were expected to follow a “five milestone” process
following a political commitment by their local governments.214
Milestone One requires the cities to “[c]onduct a baseline
emissions inventory and forecast.”215 Milestone Two calls for
the “[a]dopt[ion of] an emissions reduction target for the
forecast year.”216 Milestone Three specifies the requirements

clear that much higher emissions reductions goals were needed. See supra
Part II.A. The MCPA has not changed its targets in line with this.
210. About the Mayors Climate Protection Center, MAYORS CLIMATE
PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/about.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
211. Who We Are, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/iclei-global/who-isiclei.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
212. ICLEI Climate Program, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://archive.iclei.org/
?id=940940 (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
213. Id.
214. The Five Milestone Process, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/
index.php?id=810 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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for the development of a local action plan:
Through a multi-stakeholder process, the city develops a Local Action
Plan that describes the policies and measures that the local
government will take to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve
its emissions reduction target. . . . In addition to direct greenhouse
gas reduction measures, most plans also incorporate public awareness
and education efforts.217

Milestone Four addresses the “[i]mplement[ation of] policies
and measures.”218 Milestone Five requires the cities to monitor
and verify their respective progress on the implementation of
measures.219
GreenClimateCities is ICLEI’s newest EU-funded platform
for low-carbon city development which is meant to phase out
the CCP campaign.220 The program launched in June 2012 and
is being rolled out through pilot implementation in India, South
Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil.221 The program assists cities in
achieving low-carbon development and management through,
among other methods, technical support, networking, carbon
target-setting, emissions accounting and control, and the
quantification of reduction measures:222
Cities will receive guidance and technical support from ICLEI as they
set up their greenhouse gas emissions inventory; identify
opportunities for rapid emission reductions; develop a climate action
plan; identify finance for urban infrastructure projects; and measure
progress and report their achievements to the global carbonn Cities
Climate Registry. This 3-step approach of analyzation, action and
acceleration ensures continuation of best practices and tailors them to
the specific urban area.223

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, ICLEI GLOBAL,
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (noting that
local climate initiatives are only one part of a larger concept of low emission
urban development).
221. Email from Yunus Arikan, Manager, ICLEI, to to Myanna Dellinger,
Assistant Professor of Law, W. State Coll. of Law (Nov. 21, 2012) (on file with
author).
222. See id.; GREENCLIMATECITIES, ICLEI 1–3 (2012), available at
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/About_ICLEI/br
ochures/GCC_final_Brochure.pdf (highlighting the HEAT+ accounting and
reporting tool); Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220
(explaining the technical support and networking components).
223. GreenClimateCities: Local Governments Respond to Green Cross Task
Force’s Appeal for Urgent Action on Climate Change, ICLEI (June 18, 2012),
http://archive.iclei.org/index.php?id=1487&tx_ttnews[pS]=1357901598&tx_ttn
ews[pointer]=9&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4873&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1556&cHash=
19a23eca88 [hereinafter Local Governments Respond].
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Members of the GreenClimateCities set specific and
individual carbon reduction goals.224 These members’
individual goals are measured using Heat+, ICLEI’s globally
accessible online accounting and reporting tool sponsored by,
among others, the EU.225 Results are registered with the
carbonn Cities Climate Registry (cCCR), which is overseen by
the neutral third party Bonn Center for Local Climate Action
and Reporting.226 As of November 2012, 232 cities from 25
countries, purported to represent a population of 235 million
inhabitants and control community GHG emissions of 1.5
GtCO2 each year, reported 561 climate and energy
commitments, 557 GHG inventories, and a total of 2092
mitigation and adaptation actions and action plans through the
cCCR.227
Importantly, global partnering with other climate change
projects such as the WWF Earth Hour City Challenge, the
Japan Registry Project, and The Mexico City Pact forms a
significant part of ICLEI’s efforts, just as the initiative operates
with an interface to major supranational governmental
organizations.228 For example, Heat+ complies with the IPCC
guidelines just as ICLEI partners with the United Nations
Environmental Programme.229
Although ICLEI, and thus GreenClimateCities, asks the
members to commit to certain targets, it does not apply any
enforcement method, at least not in a traditional sense of the
word.230 Instead, the members are expected to self-police their
224. See, e.g., GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222, at 1, 3 (noting the
entry point may be different for “starters and advanced cities”); Low-Carbon,
Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220 (stating the availability of local tools
for setting local goals).
225. See Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220
(highlighting the availability of the HEAT+ system); Sponsors, HEAT+,
http://heat.iclei.org/heatplusv4n/sponsors.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2013)
(listing the organizations that support HEAT+).
226. GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222, at 4.
227. CARBONN CITIES CLIMATE REGISTRY, RAISING THE GLOBAL LEVEL OF
AMBITION THROUGH LOCAL CLIMATE ACTION 1 (2012), available at
http://citiesclimateregistry.org/fileadmin/user_upload/cCCR/cCCR_November2
012_Update/cCCR_November2012.pdf.
228. Id. at 6.
229. See GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222, at 3; Our Partners, ICLEI,
http://www.iclei.org/cn/iclei-global/our-partners.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2013).
230. See Local Governments Respond, supra note 223 (“[I]nvites cities
worldwide . . . to take voluntary climate action now . . . .”).
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efforts and make the outcomes publicly available via the
cCCR.231 Thus, members are faced with only the “threat” of
potential public scorn if they do not live up to the adopted
targets; as an enforcement mechanism, GreenClimateCities
finds itself on the voluntary end of the compliance continuum
spectrum.232 The organization recognizes this fact: “The
GreenClimateCities initiative invites cities worldwide to join
efforts by local governments from all parts of the world to take
voluntary climate action now and not wait for national
governments to eventually come to a global climate
agreement.”233
Whether this model proves to be more or less effective than
city initiatives with a more traditional “adversarial”
enforcement style, such as that employed by the Covenant,
remains to be seen. This program is too new to demonstrate
any substantive success.234 However, this and similar programs
do demonstrate the potential for, and continued interest in,
voluntary city action leading to climate change mitigation and
adaptation results.235 What appears promising from such
schemes is the ability for cities around the world to bypass
potential state and national government inaction while
maintaining an interface to, and potentially cooperating with,
supranational organizations.236 These relatively new actors
actually act, whereas traditional actors continue the stalemate
situation with which the world community has grown
increasingly dissatisfied.237 It is precisely because some of these
scaled-down initiatives are so new, yet showing progress, that
there is reason for cautious optimism that dawn is coming to
climate change efforts that go beyond mere rhetoric.238 Local
entities are adopting emissions targets with, broadly
interpreted, some accountability and repercussions for non-

231. See id.
232. Id. (mentioning ICLEI’s nineteen-year experience overseeing the
voluntary participation in its various programs).
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. The program started in June 2012 and it takes time for emissions to
be reduced and reported. See supra notes 216, 221 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
237. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–22) (highlighting the
difficulty inherent in different nations agreeing to climate change initiatives
because of competing interests).
238. See supra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing the success of the Covenant and
CRAG programs, respectively).
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compliance through a variety of voluntary and mandatory
enforcement efforts. At the more voluntary end of the spectrum
there are threats of negative publicity and calls for selfcorrection.239 At the more mandatory end there are fines,
program expulsions, and other more traditional enforcement
mechanisms.240
D. INTERIM LESSONS LEARNED FROM CITY COALITION PROGRAMS
By contrasting the above city coalition initiatives, the
following lessons about the potential efficacy of such programs
emerge: seen from a more or less isolated point of view, city
programs with at least some degree of enforcement appear to be
more effective than initiatives without any enforcement.241 The
type of sanction under the EU program—exclusion from group
membership—is arguably not terribly severe at first blush, but
may nonetheless drive members to attempt to meet their
adopted goals for “naming and shaming” and other reasons.242
Public disclosure of progress by each participating entity under
the Climate Savers program and the ICLEI-based models, for
example, has the same effects and thus demonstrates what the
program leaders themselves have determined will help drive
cities to join the initiatives and take action.243 Listening to the
actors themselves is also important to external discourse
regarding potential program efficacies.244 For example, all
programs operate with a significant degree of generalized peer
pressure and the desire to stand out as progressive leaders in

239. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176–78 (using reporting in
front of peers as its enforcement mechanism).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97, 123–29 (identifying
termination from the EU Covenant of Mayors program and fines in the CRAG
programs as the enforcement mechanisms, respectively).
241. The MCPA program employs no enforcement mechanism and has
shown little success compared to the EU Covenant of Mayors program, CRAG
programs, and the Climate Savers program. Compare supra text
accompanying note 205, with supra text accompanying notes 101, 138–40,
187–96 (sharing the success of the EU Covenant of Mayors program, CRAG
programs, and the Climate Savers program, respectively).
242. See supra Part III.A.1.
243. See supra notes 176–78, 230–33 and accompanying text (Climate
Savers and ICLEI, respectively).
244. In some of the programs, sharing experiences and knowledge is a key
component in the program. See, e.g., Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities,
supra note 220 (explaining the networking components).
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the climate change arena.245 They are based on both financial
stressors and motivators such as financing assistance, difficult
economic times requiring cross-sector energy savings, and the
realization of the danger of relying on imported oil from
politically unstable regions.246 Program signatories also wish to
benefit from the channeling of funds from competing areas to
their local areas.247 Sharing technical and non-technical
knowledge among program members and national governance
bodies is also important, just as general networking advantages
are typically listed among the benefits of joining the
programs.248
Another lesson pertains to the stronger bargaining position
of large (as compared to smaller) governmental units. Thus,
actors in the EU city scheme have recognized the benefit of
having the EU negotiate with third-party financial actors to set
up financial facilities aimed at aiding accomplishment of the
tasks of the action plans.249 Thus, vertical governance
cooperation is important in relation to the success of action
initiated by cities and other types of bottom-up action.250 Also
important is the involvement of civil society.251 The MCPA,
however, makes no references to any kind of public
participation: “Aside from a provision providing for helping
with climate change education, no reference is made to the
importance and role of an ample public consultation process.”252

245. For example, Mr. McCarty of the MCPA says that after the Seattle
mayor took the initiative for the program, the duty became viral in the United
States, even at an early point in time. Telephone Interview with Kevin
McCarty, supra note 204. According to Mr. McCarty, mayors are aware of the
fact that they are often expected to act on socio-cultural changes without
initial impetus or support by larger government bodies. Id.
246. Id.; As a Local Authority, supra note 90.
247. Telephone Interview with Kevin McCarty, supra note 204; As a Local
Authority, supra note 90.
248. See, e.g., Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220
(explaining the technical support and networking components of the program).
249. See TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 6
(highlighting the European Local Energy Assistance facility and the European
Energy Efficiency Fund).
250. Id. at 4 (stating that the covenant coordinators play an important role
in communicating between the local authorities and the larger national and
supranational entities).
251. For the advantages of civil society involvement in bottom-up
lawmaking, see Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21–28).
252. Rmulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Regulating Climate Change Risk
at the Local Level—the Denver Experience: Greenprint or Greenwash?, 17 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 356, 370 (2010).
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Opening up the policy-making process to public participation,
including discussing how to proceed on certain issues and how
the available financial and other resources should be used,
increases the legitimacy of the regulating process and shares
responsibilities of the final outcomes.253 Then the regulated can
become the regulators; a recognized advantage in modern law
and policymaking and enforcement.254 The EU model’s focus on
mobilizing civil society to take part in developing the Action
Plan is, thus, a better solution and should be emulated in
similar future programs.
It is clear that the time has come for cities and other local
governance units to step up their action and roles within
climate change mitigation and adaptation in more diverse ways
than before. Cities enjoy unique positions as advisors,
motivators, and role models.255 They can lead by example by
reducing their own energy consumption in public buildings as
well as by procuring their energy from sustainable sources.256
They can lead more awareness-raising activities.257 As
planners, regulators, and developers, they can take relevant
legislative and other legal action.258 As energy producers and
suppliers, they can promote and produce more renewable
energy.259 In the American context, had a national climate
change framework been adopted in the United States, it would
have, to a large extent, needed to be implemented at the city
level.260 Cities and other local government units must be even
more proactive and not wait for national governments to lead
the way with climate change initiatives. As the above shows,
effective action can, and should be instigated at the local level
at this point in time. All such solutions will require accurate
253. Id.
254. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25).
255. For an analysis of the several roles played by cities as well as their
importance to top-down or bottom-up governance, see Dellinger, supra note 1
(manuscript at 21–28). See also TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note
90, at 4 (“[T]he local administration is the closest government level to engage
citizens and reconcile public and private interests.”).
256. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 56–77).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Cf. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 4 (noting that
successful cooperative solutions are being achieved at the local and regional
levels even when the national and international levels are struggling to
implement a successful program).
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and reliable emissions accounting and reporting. This aspect
will be examined next.
E. REPORTING WITH MANDATORY IMPLICATIONS
To be considered reliable among climate regulation
skeptics and advocates alike, it is particularly important for
programs to ensure neutral and reliable reporting, accounting,
and compliance oversight.261 Consumer demand for
transparency with respect to environmental performance is
increasing, which further adds to the need for trustworthy
reporting programs.262 With the establishment of more and
more climate-focused initiatives around the world, it is also
necessary to apply relatively homogenous and transparent
emissions reporting standards such that it is possible to be able
to compare “apples to apples” at the international level.263 This
section will analyze the Climate Registry as an example of how
to accomplish these goals and the relevant concerns in future
developments of this and other reporting platforms.
A self-proclaimed “bottom-up” approach to emissions
accounting, the Climate Registry is a non-profit collaboration
established and governed by North American states, provinces,
territories, and Native Sovereign Nations.264 It is the only
program of its kind in North America that started and operates
as a voluntary initiative.265 The program sets standards for
members to calculate, verify, and publicly report their GHG
emissions into one single registry.266 The results are verified by
independent bodies accredited by the American National
Standards Institute.267 The Climate Registry now supports
voluntary, regulatory, and mandatory reporting programs and
261. See HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89 (belonging to the Climate Register
can legitimize reduction claims).
262. Cf. id. at 89, 91 (standardizing reporting measurements allows the
public to assess the progress and compare various entities).
263. See id. (using uniform measurements allows all members, whether
they are regulated or non-regulated, to assess their progress equally).
264. FAQs, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/
faqs/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
265. Denise Sheehan & Alex Carr, The Future of GHG Reporting:
Patchwork or Tapestry?, EM, Oct. 2010, at 12, 12–14.
266. Mission, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/
mission/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
267. See FAQs, supra note 264 (acknowledging that the verifiers have
experience in other areas of verification as well); List of Verification Bodies,
CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/resources/verification/
list-of-verification-bodies/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
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thus has both indirect, but also direct, legal implications.268
The membership consists of corporations, government
agencies (now at the city, state, and federal levels), as well as
nonprofit organizations.269 The Registry has approximately 430
current members including energy-producing and energysource companies, car manufacturers, mining companies,
environmentally-oriented NGOs, colleges, and government
bodies.270 The Registry partners with several GHG reductions
programs such as ICLEI and the U.S. Conference of Mayors’
Climate Initiative.271 Membership is also required for members
of the Western Climate Initiative.272 The EPA has, since 2009,
required reporting by “large” GHG emitters in the United
States.273 This reporting, however, must be done directly to the
EPA and thus not, for example, to the Climate Registry.274 This
may add to the “patchwork problem” whereby too many actors
on the climate change scene may add unnecessary complexity
and overlapping requirements.275 Because of the sheer extent of
EPA’s reporting requirement,276 it may be feared that this
would drive programs, such as the Climate Registry, into a
268. See FAQs, supra note 264 (explaining that while the Registry itself
will not establish any regulations, it supports the reporting of any type of
emissions data, including those that may also be recorded in order to comply
with a law).
269. List of Members, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry
.org/members/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
270. Id.
271. See FAQs, supra note 264 (expressing that the Registry is meant to be
complementary to these other programs).
272. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89 (explaining that the reporting system
used by the Climate Registry provided federal regulators with a working
model).
273. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat 1844
(2007). According to the EPA, the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program “will
help us better understand where greenhouse gas emissions are coming from
and will improve our ability to make informed policy, business, and regulatory
decisions.” Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
ghgreporting/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
274. Cf. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, supra note 273 (indicating
that all GHG data must be reported using the EPA’s GHG Reporting
Program).
275. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22) (stating that bottom-up
lawmaking can be “unchoreographed”); Sheehan & Carr, supra note 265, at
12.
276. The “EPA estimates [that the reporting rule] will cover approximately
85% of U.S. GHG emissions and apply to 10,000 facilities.” Sheehan & Carr,
supra note 265, at 12.
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state of decreased relevance. In turn, this could be a problem
to those emitters who are not required to report to the EPA,
such as smaller emitters and non-American sources.
Additionally, twenty-six states have developed, or are
developing, mandatory GHG reporting rules, many of which go
beyond the EPA requirements.277 The Registry might have a
role to play in supporting reporting under such programs. The
EPA also recognizes the importance of voluntary programs, so
program co-existence and cooperation might also become a
positive result.278
In addition to the usual benefits of membership, such as
technical assistance, networking, and promotional advantages,
membership of the Climate Registry enables participants to set
a baseline for GHG emissions for use in current and possible
future regulatory programs.279 This also positions the members
to be ready for large-scale emission trading under cap and
trade programs, should these become the norm or requirement
at a future stage.280 Further, because the Registry interfaces
with several government bodies, it already enjoys quite a bit of
legitimacy in the climate regulation context, which is also a
solid starting point if emissions trading becomes the order of
the day.281 Simply put, the Climate Registry is “building the
infrastructure for a carbon market,” but also for North
American registration efforts more broadly.282 Finally, the
interaction among government-mandated regulatory solutions
and purely voluntary, bottom-up solutions is significant in
times of still limited government mandates, because it
demonstrates how bottom-up solutions have the potential for
fossilizing into government mandates at scaled-up levels and,
thus, eventually, “hard law.”283 In short, the Climate Registry
is an example of how programs that commence as voluntary

277. Id. at 13.
278. Id. at 13–14.
279. Benefits of Participation, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.climate
registry.org/about/benefits-of-participation.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
280. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89.
281. Id. at 89–90.
282. Id. at 87.
283. The North American Energy Reliability Council has demonstrated
this potential in the field of energy reliability. See History, N. AM. ENERGY
RELIABILITY COUNCIL, http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|7|11 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013) (discussing the evolution of NERC from a voluntary, informal
organization within the energy industry to a central player in the
establishment and enforcement of mandatory energy reliability standards).
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programs may, over time and indirectly, obtain mandatory
importance.
An analysis of the different roles played by the Climate
Registry sheds further light on the broader effects and benefits
of this and similar programs. First, the Registry plays an
important functional role in standardizing GHG emissions
reporting, both for those members that are likely to be
regulated by national or regional policies and those that are
not.284 Thus, it serves a “smoothing function” by laying out
procedures and protocols for measuring carbon emissions in
uniform ways.285 Through the Registry, climate change leaders
can legitimately claim to be so.286 In fact, the most important
reason for implementing actors to join the Registry is to be
recognized for climate leadership.287 This stands in contrast to,
for example, the Climate Savers program under which some
corporations have expressed reservations regarding promoting
their environmentally friendly actions externally after recent
“greenwashing” debacles.288 The Registry is creating a platform
for transparency, accountability, and uniformity in a still
somewhat controversial branch of science and law.
Additionally, the Registry helps build a significant
domestic political carbon registration infrastructure.289 For
example, the Climate Registry influenced the EPA as it
developed its mandatory GHG reporting rule, issued in 2009.290
Corporations, government entities, and others urged the EPA
to adopt Climate Registry procedures, including the third-party
verification process, which stands at the core of the Registry’s
inventory protocols.291 The Registry is thus a “powerful
platform for subnational governments to engage with the
federal governments in the United States and Canada as they
(potentially) develop national responses to climate change.”292
The Registry is a promising development with the potential for
increased future importance should emissions reporting become

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 89.
Id.
See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89–91.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 89–90.
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more broadly mandatory. It is an innovative program that is
developing at the seams of voluntary and regulated activity and
presents a “key example of how experiments work together
across governance models . . . .”293 The program is therefore
also an example of vertical cooperation. It also demonstrates
the potential for horizontal interfacing with a variety of climate
change-related programs at similar levels, whether or not these
are, strictly seen, “mandatory,” “regulatory,” or purely
“voluntary.”
Further, the program has international potential as its
governance and general members include both American and
Canadian entities.294 The Registry has participated in
discussions about globalizing the model and may thereby gain
international reach outside the United States and Canada.295
For instance, the Registry is currently working with a Chinese
NGO and an environmental department of the government of
Israel to help develop registries in those countries.296 The
Registry is also participating in discussions about launching
similar registries in other areas.297 Thus, infrastructure
building through the Registry may be going global.298 This is
noteworthy because of the potential advantage of having fewer
global actors claiming to provide the “best” emissions
accounting and reporting oversight (and the “best” programs in
general). Homogeneity at a larger, international scale may not
only prove more intrinsically sound to the climate change
mitigation efforts and programs themselves, but also might
establish more external credibility to actors (both corporate and
governmental) who have not yet committed to any or much
action. These considerations, as well as the potential for
governments to interact effectively with non-government units
in climate reporting and overall programs, should be taken into
account in both the design and implementation of future
climate change reduction initiatives.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. WHAT DOES “SUCCESS” MEAN WITHIN THE
CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE?
Before attempting to evaluate the actual or the potential
for success of the above programs, it is necessary to consider
which benchmarks to apply in doing so. Substantive carbon
reduction improvements are of obvious importance, but other
outcome variables are also important to a possible
determination of success.
A. BENCHMARKS FOR SUCCESS
Public participation in the design, implementation, and
enforcement of laws and policies is a widely recognized
indicator of success not just within climate change, but to law
in general.299 However, one school of thought in the climate
change context is that “[b]ecause of the underlying uncertainty
on [sic] the causation between the best local climate change
mitigation policy and the real and concrete impact on a global
environmental problem, . . . efficiency can only be measured
procedurally.”300 It “cannot be measured taking into account
the quality of the final regulatory result.”301 Whereas there can
be no doubt about the many and important benefits of public
participation, and it is, to be sure, difficult to trace with exact
certainty any possible positive carbon reduction results to just
one or a few causes, such difficulty does not warrant the claim
that public participation should be the only benchmark for
success within climate change or any other area of the law.302
Causation uncertainties, as well as other legal and technical
difficulties, abound in relation to many other complex areas of
the law.303 Fortunately, that has not stopped, and should not
stop, the discourse about how to measure success more broadly
than by merely verifying the degree to which public
299. See generally Karen Syma Czapanskiy & Rashida Manjoo, The Right
of Public Participation in the Law-Making Process and the Role of Legislature
in the Promotion of This Right, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 4 (2008)
(“[L]egislation is better when legislators are required to invite and attend to
public input, and . . . citizenship is better when legislators are required to
invite and attend to public input.”).
300. Sampaio, supra note 252, at 357 (emphasis added).
301. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
302. See generally Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK.
L. REV. 847 (2008).
303. Id.
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participation is applied in various initiatives. Courses of action,
legislative progress, and on-the-ground results can be
evaluated retroactively in an attempt to identify general
patterns that appear to indicate greater substantive efficiencies
than others. Because law and policy are not an exact science,
attempting to achieve “exact certainty” in relation to what may
work and what may not is too limiting and does not help in
moving the agenda forward. This article thus also measures
indicia of possible substantive efficacy in addition to public
participation.
The best measure of success of environmental initiatives is,
in fact, widely considered to be the substantive improvement of
environmental conditions, sustainability, and improved energy
infrastructures.304 As regards to climate change in particular,
success measured in terms of actual effects would thus
encompass, among other things, reduced carbon emissions,
reduced energy consumption in general, and reduced total costs
of reducing CO2 levels.305 As there is still uncertainty as to how
to achieve these goals, flexibility in program designs is also a
key benchmark of success within climate change efforts.306 As
precious time goes by without climate change being addressed
sufficiently, it also becomes more and more necessary for
effective programs to include adaptation measures in addition
to prevention.307 Adaptation efforts must include components
that protect both natural resources and natural services as well
as humankind from the coming crises.308 Adaptation and
prevention are considered to form part of a “basic litmus test”
for regional systems, but of course also apply to national and

304. See, e.g., Laura C. Bickel, Baby Teeth: An Argument in Defense of the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 849
(2003); Carrie Dolmat-Connell, After Nafta: Can A New International
Convention On Toxic Trade Be Far Behind?, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 443, 458–59
(1994); J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 988 n. 210 (1997); Andrew Schatz,
Discounting the Clean Development Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
703, 722 (2008); Susan A. Schneider, Reconsidering the Industrialization of
Agriculture, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 19, 27 (2011).
305. Cf. Kevin Begos, U.S. Carbon Emissions: 2012 Levels at 20 Year Low,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2012, 10:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/16/us-carbon-dioxide-emissions-2012_n_1792167.html.
306. James Olmsted, The Global Warming Crisis: An Analytical
Framework to Regional Responses, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 125, 159 (2008).
307. Id. at 165–67.
308. Id.
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supranational efforts.309
Another layer of analysis can be applied to the above
considerations regarding success within climate change efforts,
namely what has been termed the “Who, When, and How
Test.”310 The “Who” part of the test examines the type of action
bodies that are created in connection with new legislation or
other relevant action, and who is appointed to such bodies.311
Responsible task forces with leaders willing and able to move
the agenda forward must be established.312 Accordingly, such
parties must be willing to fully implement potential new laws
to avoid a de facto failure of the “Who” test.313 They should not,
however, have unfettered discretion in how to reach the
objectives with which they have been tasked. For example:
[A]n agency often becomes more powerful and has more control over
particular outcomes than the legislature, particularly in light of the
broad discretion courts usually give agencies. In this case, resources,
authority, and discretion can easily become global warming negatives.
Political leaders may come and go, but agency personnel will most
often retain their positions through multiple administrations. Once
entrenched in their jobs, such agency personnel may develop great
power, but then use that power to maintain their own positions rather
than bravely striking out to implement the true intent of the law. As
can be readily imagined, the Who test may be the most important
factor in any analysis of how a bill will work.314

The “When” test looks at whether timeframes for action are
sufficiently short: “Because time is of the essence in every last
effort to mitigate global warming, [a] lack of specificity
regarding timing may represent a failure of the When test.”315
The “How” test requires specificity in relation to how to reach
the program goals.316
Finally, the “success” of any environmental program will
have to include a significant mobilization of broad segments of
private forces including corporations. Whereas governments
and the public-interest sector have important roles to play,
solutions that do not seek to involve even broader segments of
civil society and the business sector run the risk of becoming
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 156–57.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 157–58.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 157–58.
Id. at 158.
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lopsided at best and ineffective at worst. In former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s words: “Action starts with
Governments. . . . But Governments cannot do [this] alone.
Civil society groups have a critical role, as partners, advocates
and watchdogs. So do commercial enterprises. Without the
private sector, sustainable development will remain only a
distant dream.”317 Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of
the UNFCCC, agrees, “We need the corporate sector to play a
part [in the fight against climate change] and to contribute.”318
B. CAN LOCAL ACTION BE “TOO SUCCESSFUL”?
Localized climate change action does not only create viable
steps towards climate change mitigation and adaptation; there
is also a flip side of the coin. The proliferation of local
initiatives has demonstrated pitfalls that should be borne in
mind and, if possible, avoided in future processes. Some of
these negative concerns include the following.
First, “[t]here is a tendency to measure success in the field
of environmental law more in terms of legal acts than in terms
of actually improving the environment.”319 However, the true
measure of success in this field is, of course, whether actual
results are achieved. In fact, more and more acts, regulations,
and programs may well lead to an inopportune fragmentation
of otherwise potentially promising initiatives into disjointed,
inhomogeneous action, and thus be counterproductive to the
ultimate goal. More concerted action would be better. There is
no need to reinvent the wheel again and again, as currently
seems to be the direction in which many actors are going.320
This will not help the agenda out of the stalemate in which it
has found itself in recent years. It thus seems that instead of
317. Attila Tanzi, Controversial Developments in the Field of Public
Participation in the International Environmental Law Process, in NGOS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 136 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy &
Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008).
318. Doha Conference Leaders Hail UN Climate Change Agreement, SAUDI
GAZETTE
(Dec. 11, 2012, 12:34 AM), http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/
index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20121211145601.
319. Dolmat-Connell, supra note 304, at 458 (quoting Mostafa Tolba,
Report of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental
law for the Review of Montevideo Programme, Oct. 30–Nov. 2, 1991, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/Env.Law/2/3 (Nov. 22, 1991), reprinted in TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BASIC DOCUMENTS 186 (Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H.A. Soons eds.,
1993)) (internal brackets omitted).
320. See supra notes 85–298 and accompanying text.
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focusing on efficiency and substance, some of these actors are
using climate change just as much or more for promotional
reasons than for the goal of reaching the actual goals necessary
to prevent extreme climate change.321 Less fragmentation and
more cooperation would be ideal.
Further, when action becomes too widespread, the
potential for cost savings due to economies of scale becomes
diminished.322 From an important technical point of view, some
pollutants may also escape limiting action altogether through
schemes that are too fragmented: “[B]ecause the sources of
GHGs are globally widespread, even ubiquitous, in every
country and every sector of the economy, subglobal regulatory
coverage fails to control important sources of pollutants.”323
Similarly, an important cross-border “leakage” problem
may become the result of action that is “too” localized.324
“Leakage” denotes situations where subglobal and/or
subnational regulations encourage emissions “activities to shift
or ‘leak’ to unregulated areas over time.”325 It can be traced to
three causes: “a price effect, a ‘slack off’ effect, and a capital
relocation effect.”326 The price effect relates to situations in
which GHG regulations in one geographical area may affect the
prices of and thus demand for certain products in that country
with a spill-over effect in another.327 Consider, for example,
that “restricting forest clearing in Country A would restrict
timber supply and raise the world market price for timber,
inducing an increase in the quantity of timber harvested in
Country B” instead.328 Of course, “[t]he magnitude of these
effects depends on . . . how much the activity levels change in
response to price changes . . . and on the degree of integration

321. Olmsted, supra note 306, at 158.
322. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change PressureCooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in
the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1355, 1371 (2008) (discussing uniformity and
economies of scale as traditional justifications for environmental regulation at
the federal level, and applying these principals to regional approaches to
climate change).
323. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits Of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967 (2007).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1967–68.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1968.
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of world markets for the relevant goods and services.”329
Second, “restrictions on emissions in Country A could induce
emissions-intensive industries to uproot and relocate facilities
to unregulated Country B” for cost-savings reasons.330 Third,
[t]he “slack off” effect is a response to changing national net benefits.
In the absence of a treaty, Country A might undertake some
abatement, just to the point where its (small) domestic share of the
global marginal benefits equals its domestic marginal costs of
abatement. Country B would do likewise. But if Country A begins to
abate its own emissions more aggressively, some additional global
protection would be obtained, and the marginal benefit to Country B
of its own abatement efforts would be diminished slightly (on the
standard assumption of diminishing marginal benefits of protection),
so that the domestically rational degree of abatement in Country B
would fall. Hence, as some states emit less, other states rationally
emit more.331

The leakage considerations apply to both the global regime
and to the United States system if regulations are taken at the
subnational level without coherence provided by federal
umbrella provisions.332 Whereas these considerations are
important and must be addressed in the development of future
localized climate solutions, they should not be allowed stop or
slow down the currently necessary development of the area.
V. THE STATUS: IS IT WORTH PURSUING CLIMATE
CHANGE ACTION AT THE LOCALIZED LEVEL?
This section will apply the above factors for determining
the possible success of climate change programs to the
described initiatives in order to analyze whether action at the
subnational level already is or is likely to become successful as
seen from both the procedural and the substantive points of
view. For the sake of brevity, and to follow the scholastic
benchmarks for success set forth above, the factors are grouped
into the “actor” and “substance” categories. The “actor” analysis
will ascertain whether there is a risk that program leaders
have too much discretion, whether public participation is
required, whether corporations are involved, and whether
polycentric action, in general, forms a part of the programs.
The “substance” analysis will establish whether any promising
on-the-ground indicators or results can currently be identified,

329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1968–69.
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whether program goals operate within a sufficiently narrow
timeframe, and how the initiatives plan to meet their goals.
A. ACTION AT THE PRIVATE, VOLUNTARY LEVEL: CRAGS AND THE
NUDGE THEORY
This article has examined CRAGs as an example of a
bottom-up solution initiated without any government mandates
or
interaction,
but
with
self-imposed
compliance
enforcement.333 Such voluntary NGO action has, at least until
recently, been widely touted as a promising possibility for
success, especially since government units remain as reluctant
to act as they do.334 However, the answer to whether such
action will suffice in relation to climate-change action, must, on
balance, be “no.”
First, CRAG actors are not powerful enough.335 While the
“Who” test referenced above mentions concern over
authoritative program leaders with unfettered discretion over
action,336 experience shows the opposite: the CRAG programs
tend to be led by peers who must agree upon what action to
take and how to reach the goals.337 Where such unity is
laudable in theory, clearer top-down leadership must also be a
part of successful programs.338 Within the CRAG scheme,
however, this vital component appears to be lacking.339
Additionally, participation by distinct groups of actors is

333. See supra Part III.A.2.
334. See Boyd Cohen, U.S. NGOs that are Moving the Needle on Climate
Change, TRIPLEPUNDIT.COM (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.triplepundit.com/
2011/03/ngos-moving-needle-climate-change/ (“[T]here are so many NGOs
doing powerful work to make the low-carbon shift at local, regional, national
and international levels . . . .”).
335. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 4, 11–12, 14–15 (discussing CRAG
problems such as inactivity of members, manipulating carbon quotas by giving
children their full quota while they really need less, and ability or willingness
of members to pay carbon quota fines voluntarily).
336. Olmsted, supra note 306, at 258.
337. See HOWELL, supra note 30, at 3–4 (discussing that CRAGs are really
“groups formed to encourage members to reduce their carbon footprints” by
holding themselves accountable).
338. Cf. Richard W. Scholl, Leader Behavior and Motivation, U.R.I.,
http://www.uri.edu/research/lrc/scholl/webnotes/Leadership_Behavior.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Effective leadership is viewed by most people as
fundamental to the success of any organization.”).
339. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 23–27.
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limited.340 CRAGs serve only private interest groups whereas
polycentric action typically includes interaction among
government units, corporations, in addition to private interest
groups.341
Second, the most important problem in connection with the
substance of the CRAG initiative is the apparent lack of
continued or renewed activity among participants.342 This is
unfortunate given that some CRAGers have reduced their
carbon footprint by up to 27% in the first year of operations.343
With continued participation, these groups could attain
substantively far-reaching goals of up to 10% GHG reductions
per annum.344
On the other hand, while continued participation may be
lacking,345 there are promising aspects of CRAGs. For one, at
least some people accept fines in binding GHG-reduction
schemes.346 Where some governments have not yet adopted
such penalties, acquiescence to self-imposed fines among CRAG
members could be comparatively noteworthy for lawmakers.347
However, how broadly such an enforcement scheme would be
accepted by civil society not only in the United Kingdom, but
especially in the more heavily emitting nations such as the
United States, is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to
say, fines imposed upon private individuals for exceeding
carbon rations would undoubtedly meet with resistance in
many places.348 The CRAG scheme also illustrates how laws
340. Cf. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate
Change 35 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (“[M]ultiple benefits
are created by diverse actions at multiple scales.”).
341. See id. at 4 (“To solve climate change in the long run, the day-to-day
activities of individuals, families, firms, communities, and governments at
multiple levels—particularly those in the more developed world—will need to
change substantially.”).
342. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 23–28.
343. Id. at 18–19.
344. Id. at 11.
345. Id. at 23–28.
346. Id. at 13 (“Of the 24 ‘active’ CRAGs listed on the website, 14 definitely
have a financial penalty for exceeding the carbon target, ranging from 2p to
10p per kilogram . . .”).
347. But see AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WATER,
POPULATION
&
COMMUNITIES,
COMPLIANCE
AND
ENFORCEMENT
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SYNTHETIC GREENHOUSE GASES 3 (2012), available at
http://www.environment.gov.au/atmosphere/ozone/sgg/equivalentcarbonprice/p
ublications/pubs/fs8-ecp-compliance.pdf.
348. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 13 (“The idea of a fine for going above a
certain amount was thought that it would put potential members off.”).
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that are seen as sound from a personal and social perspective
will meet with greater acceptance than those that are not.349 It
is thus important to continue to bring attention to the potential
threats associated with climate change to garner broad support
for legislation.350 Focus on the threat of climate change,
however, has regrettably been decreasing in recent years.351
Outside of CRAGs and climate change, private action
without government mandate has, by way of comparison, been
promoted under such names as the “nudge theory.”352
Described by the authors as “libertarian paternalism,”353 the
nudge theory was popularized by law professor Cass Sunstein
and economist Richard Thaler in their recent book on how to
influence private behavior without offering financial incentives
or imposing government sanctions.354 Similarly, Christiana
Figueres has also recently called for private citizens to “assume
responsibility” for climate change, although she did not
specifically label her call a “nudge.”355 For a policy to be a
nudge, it has to involve changing our physical or social
environment in a way that does not restrict our choices or
change financial incentives.356 For example, successes in
behavioral change through nudges may include attitudes
349. See id. at 23 (“[I]nterviewees from WSP mentioned increased
awareness and understanding of their emissions as benefits of being involved
in the scheme . . .”). WSP is a geographically dispersed CRAG. See id.
350. Cf. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elite, Social Movements, and the Law: The
Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1447 (2005) (discussing
how public awareness and media were used to effectively lobby affirmativeaction legislation).
351. Rob Jordan, Support for Climate Change Action Drops, Stanford Poll
Finds, STAN. NEWS (May 8, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/
may/climate-change-survey-050812.html.
352. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ.
Press 2008) (describing the nudge theory).
353. Id. at 5 (defining libertarianism as “liberty-preserving” with the aim of
not burdening those who want to exercise their freedom and “paternalism” as
trying to influence people’s behavior and choices in directions that will make
choosers better off, as judged by themselves).
354. See generally id.
355. Karl Ritter, Christiana Figueres, UN Climate Chief, Says Individuals
Need to ‘Assume Responsibility’ to Address Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
30, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/30/christianafigueres-un_n_2217056.html.
356. Baroness Julia Neuberger, Why a Nudge is Not Enough to Change
Behaviour, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2011, 8:54 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/health-14186806.
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towards smoking reduction,357 taking shorter showers,358
turning off lights when leaving a room,359 attitudes towards
eating healthily,360 and discouraging intoxicated driving.361
Examples of nudges within the environmental field include the
use of thermostats that state the cost per hour of increasing or
decreasing room temperatures.362 A company has already
designed a relatively inexpensive unit that wirelessly connects
to a home’s energy meter and displays electricity usage in
watts or money.363 A blue glow indicates that less electricity
than usual is being used; a red glow means the opposite.364
This is considered more helpful in effectuating actual change
among consumers than are more lofty informational
campaigns.365 Other countries, such as Japan, Great Britain,
and France, also seem to be endorsing the “nudge” approach.366
These countries display, or are planning to display, a product’s
carbon footprint on product labeling in order to raise public
awareness about global warming.367 Perhaps most indicatively,
357. Jonathan Ball, Nudge Tactics No “Magic Bullet,” BBC NEWS (Sept. 6,
2012, 11:40 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-19506608.
358. See, e.g., Take Shorter Showers, BOS. U. SUSTAINABILITY,
http://www.bu.edu/sustainability/what-you-can-do/ten-sustainableactions/take-shorter-showers/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
359. See, e.g., When to Turn Off Your Lights, ENERGY.GOV (Aug. 30, 2012,
7:53 PM), http://energy.gov/energysaver/articles/when-turn-your-lights.
360. See, e.g., Eat Healthy, LETSMOVE.GOV, http://www.letsmove.gov/eathealthy (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
361. See, e.g., Five Minutes or Less for Health Weekly Tip: Don’t Drink and
Drive,
CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/family/minutes/tips/dontdrinkanddrive/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
362. See generally Smarthours Questions and Answers, OGE.COM,
http://www.oge.com/residential-customers/products-and-services/Pages/
SmartHours.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (detailing a thermostat program
that shows energy cost savings).
363. Id.; Ambient: Information at a Glance, AMBIENT DEVICES,
http://www.ambientdevices.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
364. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 352, at 194.
365. See generally VINCENT P. GAMBAL, PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS:
AN APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (1990), available at
http://www.udel.edu/communication/web/thesisfiles/gambalthesis.pdf
(discussing the range of effectiveness on informational campaigns as relatively
effective to completely ineffective).
366. See Britain Shapes Good Citizens with a Gentle ‘Nudge,’ JAPAN TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/04/world/britainshapes-good-citizens-with-a-gentle-nudge/#.URQsLmdhW8A;
Carbon
Footprint Labels are Spreading, NUDGE BLOG (Aug. 21, 2008),
http://nudges.org/2008/08/21/carbon-footprint-labels-are-spreading/
[hereinafter Carbon Footprint Labels].
367. See Carbon Footprint Labels, supra note 366.
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the Sacramento Municipal Water District uses a simple,
reader-friendly Home Electricity Report that specifies how the
users’ energy use compares with that of both their “efficient
neighbors” (“those that fall under a specified standard”) and
“all neighbors.”368 This report ranks people’s energy use “as
great, good, or below average (with one smiley face for good,
and two for great).”369 Furthermore, these users are “shown
how their own [energy] use compares with that of their efficient
neighbors [by] percentages and bar charts. (‘Last month, you
used 40 percent more electricity than your efficient
neighbors.)”370 Finally, customers are shown in big letters how
much money they are paying per year as a result of their
possible inefficiency (“At today’s rates this COSTS YOU
ABOUT $358 PER YEAR”).371 Additionally, and importantly,
“consumers are also given ‘personalized [energy-saving] tips’
that are specifically ‘based on [their] energy use and housing
profile’” (such as unplugging appliances, smart purchases, and
investments in maintenance of heating/cooling systems).372 In
this manner, specific and realistic energy-saving options may
aid climate change goals more than common factual messages
such as “stop flying” or “help save the environment,” as is often
displayed on hotel room signs asking patrons to consider
reusing towels instead of having them washed, which are
considered less effective.373
Although nudge theory is an appealing and promising idea,
it may be necessary to simply “force,” not just nudge, action
against climate change whether through legal and/or financial
methods such as carbon taxes or tax credits. Indeed, the
authors of Nudge recognize the “status quo bias,” where, in
general, people “have a more general tendency to stick with
their current situation.”374 This may explain the inability to
instigate present-day action within climate change, which is
still largely seen as a “future” problem. In contrast, the ozone
368. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 259 (Penguin Books
2009).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. E.g., Andrews, supra note 103, at 43 (discussing CRAGs as a
“practical implementation of a well-researched policy”).
374. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 352, at 34–35.

DELLINGER_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

7/8/2013 10:00 AM

LOCALIZING CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION

657

depletion problem, arguably initiated a greater willingness to
act due to the problem’s here-and-now effect (fears at the time
were of losing one’s eyesight due to the lack of a protective
ozone layer).375
The UK is one of the nations that, so far, has favored the
“nudge,” approach to various problems, but a recent report by
the British Government Committee concludes that nudges
alone won’t work.376 It may be necessary to use a range of
different policies, including government regulation.377 A recent
poll, for example, found that “‘while recycling is widespread in
America and 73% of those polled are paying bills online in order
to save paper,’ only four percent had reduced their utility use
and only three percent had purchased hybrid cars.”378 Although
this a step in the right direction, it is not enough: “Given a
hundred years, you could conceivably change lifestyles enough
to matter—but time is precisely what we lack.”379 Professor
Lord John Krebs concurs in findings presented at a recent
British Science Festival: nudges are successful in some areas,
but not always.380 They should not be regarded as a “get out of
jail free” card by governments wishing to avoid tougher
approaches like regulation or taxation.381 Instead, a
combination of approaches—social nudging, regulation,
taxation, and investment—may be most effective in relation to
time sensitive problems such as climate change.382
In short, action at the purely private level will not suffice
to solve the climate change problem. If privately initiated
programs were interfaced with programs with more binding
authority and resources, their success rate would have
potential to increase.

375. See Ozone Depletion—Why It’s a Problem, ECOEVALUATOR.COM,
http://www.ecoevaluator.com/environment/air-quality/ozone-depletion.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
376. Neuberger, supra note 356 (“[F]or the most important problems facing
us at the moment, the science says that ‘nudging’ won’t be enough.”).
377. Id.
378. McKibben, supra note 13, at 56.
379. Id.
380. See Amy Richards, The Nudge Debate—A Strategic Approach Gets
Results, DIVACREATIVE.COM (Sept. 2012), http://www.divacreative.com/blog/
the-nudge-debate-a-strategic-approach-gets-results/.
381. Ball, supra note 357.
382. Id.
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B. ACTION AT THE CITY LEVEL: EU COVENANT OF MAYORS AND
GREENCLIMATECITIES383
Action at the city level appears to be the most promising of
the initiatives analyzed here. From a positive angle, because
the programs constitute cooperation among cities equally
situated within the programs, the risk of actors that are “too”
powerful from an organizational point of view does not appear
to be a problem.384 Nonetheless, one may fear that some cities
may, over time, capture the de facto leadership of these
programs—whether for altruistic or more self-focused
reasons—and thus obtain inexpediently strong leadership roles
vis-à-vis other cities. This concern should, however, be
addressed internally through proper procedural preventative
measures. The following comparison between the EU Covenant
of Mayors and GreenClimateCities explains why.
The EU Covenant of Mayors attempts to motivate civil
society to cooperate with the member cities in developing action
plans.385 This seems to be a procedurally sound practice. In
contrast, GreenClimateCities does not seem to emphasize public
participation in its documentation.386 The program is still new,
so, giving it the benefit of the doubt, the correction of these
issues may well be in the pipeline, which would be desirable for
the reasons established above. The EU Covenant of Mayors
attempts to share information with other territorial units, and
thus to undertake at least some, albeit not much, polycentric
action.387 The focus on territories, however, seems to indicate
that the Covenant does not plan to involve Public-Interest
NGOs (PINGOs) or Business-Interest NGOs (BINGOs) to a
significant extent in its work. When the research for this article

383. The MCPA has purposefully been omitted from this section due to the
organization’s lack in updating commitments at the end of 2012 when this
article was written.
384. This of course remains a concern at the individual city level, where
mayors may have relatively large amounts of power depending on the
democratic design in question. Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31)
(discussing how public participation helps to avoid “ivory tower decisions”). In
the climate context, however, “strong” mayors have helped the agenda
forward, such as in the cases of New York and Seattle. See id. (manuscript at
56–58, 67–76); U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra
note 202.
385. See TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89.
386. See generally GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222.
387. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 4.
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was concluded, GreenClimateCities did not mention any type of
polycentric cooperation in its materials beyond the obvious
cooperation among the governance members themselves.388
Cities or other governmentally established geographical units
will thus be the only responsible parties under both the EU
Covenant and the GreenClimateCities programs. But
polycentric action is a recognized benchmark of success,
especially if both business- and public-interest NGOs are
involved in the same programs.389 This consideration could also
be applied to the city level and should thus be taken into
account for greater possibilities of effectiveness and
inclusiveness in city coalition programs.
Substantively, the EU Covenant of Mayors program
appears to be promising. The 20% reductions goal by 2020 is
positive.390 However, it is important to remember that, by
definition, this goal only accounts for one-fifth of the total effort
required by the EU, thus still leaving no less than four-fifths of
the goal to be accomplished by non-members, including many
rural areas. Although some less urbanized areas such as
counties and metropolitan districts have joined the initiative,
members are typically towns, cities, and other relatively
urbanized areas.391 Given the fact that most sources of CO2
(i.e., power plants, companies, and urban residents) are found
in urban areas, one would have hoped that by now, the
umbrella goals of such urban areas would have reached farther
than the arguably still meager 20%. At the same time, it should
be remembered that other official and unofficial programs also
overlap with or compare to the Covenant.392 This patchwork
situation is not ideal as it is not only difficult to overview, but
also creates risks that gaps exist and remain unnoticed in what
should ideally be an all-encompassing blanket.393 Nonetheless,
it is promising that clear reductions goals have been announced
under the EU Covenant, that these goals will not be met solely
or mainly by cap-and-trade programs but by actual emissions
reductions, that there is a specific year for goal fulfillment that
is not too distant, and that the program is spreading to other

388. See generally GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222.
389. See generally Ostrom, supra note 340.
390. See TOWARDS A LOWER CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 3.
391. COVENANT OF MAYORS, 4286 SIGNATORIES (2013), available at
http://www.eumayors.eu/covenant_signatories.pdf.
392. See TOWARDS A LOWER CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 6.
393. Sheenan & Carr, supra note 265, at 12.

DELLINGER_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

660

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/8/2013 10:00 AM

[Vol. 14:2

parts of the world than just the EU. It is also noteworthy that
some EU actors are willing to exceed the established targets.394
This compares favorably to the ClimateSavers program under
which some corporations employ similar “stretch targets” that
ask them to go further than what they originally thought they
could and bodes well for quasi-voluntary action.395 In contrast,
the goals and enforcement methods of the GreenClimateCities
are somewhat unclear at this point in time.396
In short, action against climate change at the city level is
promising. Most importantly though, climate change programs
should be considered against the risk of overcrowding by a
proliferation of too many patchwork programs and actors, most
of whom invariably claim to have the best solution(s) to the
problem and be the next leaders of action at the sub-national,
sub-state level. It would instead be preferable if larger
government units and supranational organizations would
(re-)enter the scene to cooperate and otherwise interface
legislatively, practically, and politically with the city actors.
This is so because there are, as amply demonstrated elsewhere,
many roles that only such larger units can undertake or that
they are best positioned to undertake.397 Importantly here,
larger governance units can create and enforce umbrella action
goals, which could help alleviate the above-mentioned problem
of overcrowding.398 Further, deeper and broader involvement by
state, national, and supranational actors would not only lend
more force to the regime in general, but also more credibility to

394. Covenant of Mayors News, COVENANT OF MAYORS, http://www.
covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“By their
commitment, Covenant signatories aim to meet and exceed the European
Union 20% CO2 reduction objective by 2020.”).
395. WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE, THE CLIMATE SAVERS PROGRAMME:
HOW CORPORATIONS CAN SAVE THE CLIMATE 19 (2007) [hereinafter THE
CLIMATE SAVERS PROGRAMME], available at http://awsassets.panda.org/
downloads/cs_web_version_may2008_1.pdf (“The reductions–described within
the company as ‘stretch targets’ will be achieved through a mix of energy
efficiency and renewable energy projects carried out at Novo Nordisk
operations globally.”).
396. See generally GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222.
397. Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 18–19).
398. See generally NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: COMMUNICATIONS UMBRELLA
(2011), available at http://www.demandresponsesmartgrid.org/Resources/
Documents/NAP%20Docs/NAPC%20Action%20Guide%20Part%201%2011.07.0
7.pdf.
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action taken in cooperation with actors at lower levels.399
Cities have demonstrated the potential for innovative and
effective action within areas other than climate change. For
example, the San Francisco ban on free plastic grocery bags has
spread to such cities as Los Angeles, California;400 Toronto,
Canada;401 and Delhi, India.402 Other cities, such as Santa Fe,
New Mexico, are considering the ban as well.403 Many
jurisdictions—seventy in California alone—have approved bans
on polystyrene cups and food containers.404
New York City adopted a more controversial ban on the
sale of large-sized sodas for health reasons.405 The long-term
viability and success of New York City’s ban remains to be seen
as it was recently declared invalid and an appeal is pending.406
However, it still bodes well for climate change governance that
effective legislative and other action does spring up at the city
level, even when not required by state or national bodies.

399. See Tiffany Stecker, Adaptation: Companies Tackle ‘Weird Water’
Risks Head-On, EENEWS.NET (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/
public/climatewire/2012/09/04/2 (discussing how the SEC findings were able to
“lend credibility” to climate risk companies).
400. Plastic Bag Ban, supra note 3.
401. Michael Lauzon, Plastic Bag Manufacturers Take Legal Action
Against Toronto Bag Ban, PLASTICSNEWS.COM (Nov. 20, 2012, 12:25 PM),
http://www.plasticsnews.com/headlines2.html?id=27079&channel=450.
402. Tyler Falk, Delhi Imposes Complete Ban of Plastic Bags, SMART
PLANET (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/cities/
delhi-imposes-complete-ban-of-plastic-bags/5192.
403. Telephone Interview with Katherine Mortimer, Programs Manager,
Sustainable Santa Fe with Myanna Dellinger, Assistant Professor of Law, W.
State Coll. of Law (Aug. 16, 2012); see also Solid Waste Reduction, Sustainable
Santa Fe, SANTA FE 400, http://www.santafenm.gov/index.aspx?NID=1367
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Seek funding to develop a reusable bag, with the
option of stores adding their logo, along with a ‘Sustainable Santa Fe’ logo, to
encourage bag reuse. This can be combined with an ordinance restricting free
bag distribution from stores.”).
404. See Wendy Koch, Cities Have ‘Tidal Wave’ of Bans on Foam
Containers, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2012, at A3.
405. Daniel Engber, Fuzzy and Fizzy: The Contested Science Behind
Bloomberg’s Ban on Large-Sized Sodas, SLATE.COM (Sept. 13, 2012, 1:15PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/06/bloomberg_b
ans_large_sized_soda_the_science_behind_the_decision_.html. However, this
ban is controversial and may not go into effect. See NYC Soda Ban Rejected:
Judge Strikes Down Limit on Large Sugary Drinks as ‘Arbitrary, Capricious,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/03/11/nyc-soda-ban-dismissed-judge-large-sugarydrinks_n_2854563.html.
406. Michael Howard Saul, Judge Cans Soda Ban, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12,
2013, at A19.
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C. ACTION AT THE ESTABLISHED NGO-LEVEL: CLIMATE SAVERS
Environmental discourse often laments the lack of
corporate involvement in non-governmentally mandated
climate change solutions.407 The Climate Savers program is an
example of how corporations do, in some instances, voluntarily
involve themselves in climate work.408 The program is also an
example, at least in this instance, of how corporations take this
a step further and cooperate successfully with a PINGO,
namely the WWF, which oversees Climate Savers.409 The
BINGO-PINGO cooperation itself demonstrates a procedurally
successful aspect of the program. This type of cross-sectoral
NGO cooperation is very promising.
Public participation—generally a hallmark of procedural
success410—is not directly relevant to Climate Savers, at least
not to the same extent as with government programs. This is
because the Climate Savers program is by definition an
initiative by and for the public, in this instance companies,411
whereas the public participation concern centers more on
traditional governance units.412 Of course, expanded
cooperation with government entities at any level and with
other PINGOs or BINGOs would be desirable.
On the other hand, a concern when measuring the success
of environmental programs is, as always, whether
implementing or other leading actors may become too powerful
in relation to other internal and external actors.413 The Climate
Savers program brings forward this concern. The program
membership includes corporate giants with the potential for
paving the way in positive, but arguably also in negative,
ways.414 Most environmentally interested stakeholders appear
to share the concern that with the large amount of corporate
resources, and thus potential for leverage possessed by the type
of companies involved in programs such as Climate Savers,
comes the risk of excessive influence both within the program
and externally. In the United States, corporations are widely
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 29–30).
See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 167.
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considered to have already “captured” many government
units.415 This concern also applies to the private organizational
level where leadership could similarly be captured by the
strongest actors. After the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,416
fears that corporations can and do yield excessive powers—not
only within certain circles such as the groups of which they are
members, but also in society at large—are certainly not
shrinking.417 After environmental scandals such as the BP
disaster, the fear of corporations proclaiming to be
environmentally “friendly,” only to actually remain on a
traditional profits-above-everything-else course, remains very
real.418
The risk, as demonstrated in Part IV.A, is one of unfettered
discretion. In the Climate Savers network, it does not appear
that any given corporation enjoys disproportionately broad
powers in relation to other members or to the program
leadership. However, civil society’s general concern that with
“leadership” and prominence comes the risk of negative
dominance is understandable. It is a concern that Climate
Savers should address with external stakeholders for a greater
level of approval among, in particular, non-corporate
stakeholders in the climate process at large. On balance,
however, it is fair to consider Climate Savers a procedural
success because of, in particular, its PINGO/BINGO interface,
the reliable nature of the oversight and well-established NGO,
and the clear processes for goal-fulfillment.419
Climate Savers also appears substantively promising. In
particular, the program’s use of stretch targets indicates a
corporate awareness that more action—and not the resistance
for which many corporations are notorious in the climate
context—is needed to achieve substantively successful climate

415. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks, The Corporate Capture of the United
States, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2012,
10:21 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/01/05/the-corporatecapture-of-the-united-states/ (“The financial power of American corporations
now controls every stage of politics—legislative, executive, and ultimately
judicial.”).
416. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
417. See Jill Greenfield, Experts Assess Impact of Citizens United, HARV.
GAZETTE (Feb. 3, 2012), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/02/
experts-assess-impact-of-citizens-united/.
418. See supra notes 55–58, 197 and accompanying text.
419. See supra Part III.B.
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goals.420 Further, companies have already achieved two-digit
reduction percentages while the Kyoto Protocol was operating
with single-digit reduction percentage figures, at least until
very recently.421 It is also noteworthy that these companies
have achieved their reductions while increasing corporate sales
growth,
even
in
today’s
financially
very
difficult
circumstances.422 The fact that not insignificant emissions
reductions are well underway at the voluntary, corporate level
is a substantive success, as is the program’s focus on thirdparty compliance review.423
In short, it is worth pursuing voluntary action at the
BINGO level, although some risk factors exist. Cynics will
point out that companies may simply participate in programs
such as Climate Savers because of public relations advantages,
the potential for corporate savings, the risk of shareholder
hostility and potential lawsuits if not taking action, or because
companies realize that regulations appear inevitable in the
long run.424 At any rate, it cannot reasonably be disputed that,
regardless of motivation, it is positive that some action is taken
by the corporate world. Broader, more far-reaching corporate
action would be even better. However, the fact that many large
and well-known companies cooperate with Climate Savers has
the potential to create a trend that other perhaps more
resistant companies will not be able to avoid in the long run for
a variety of reasons. In combination with the pressure exerted
by city, and hopefully soon national and international
governance units, there may be grounds for hope that
companies will soon form a larger active part of possible
solution to the climate change challenge.
D. MULTI-SECTOR ACTION: THE CLIMATE REGISTRY
Reliable, accurate, and transparent carbon accounting and
registration are necessary for progress against climate change
at any front. Third-party oversight lends necessary credibility

420. THE CLIMATE SAVERS PROGRAMME, supra note 395, at 19; supra notes
172–73 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 60, 189 and accompanying text.
422. For example, Johnson & Johnson simultaneously surpassed a
reduction target while increasing sales growth in 2010. Supra notes 188–90
and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 180–86 and accompanying text.
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to carbon reduction programs and allows for future
enforcement based on data that is accessible and verifiable by
the overseeing bodies. Because of the highly technical and
global nature of the underlying problem, uniform or at least
comparable standards are necessary. The Climate Registry is
one example of a platform for addressing these concerns. It
demonstrates the possibilities for successful interaction among
city, state, federal, and tribal government entities as well as
across to civil society represented via BINGOs and/or PINGOs.
The program also is an example of how programs may
expand from purely voluntary, bottom-up action to having
regulatory implications if or when governments start requiring
the type of service that programs such as the Climate Registry
provide.425 Vertical and horizontal cooperation among
government and civil society actors is key in the environmental
arena as well as more broadly. The Climate Registry
exemplifies the possibilities of such cooperation. Where this can
be expanded to the international level, such as is likely in the
case of the Climate Registry, the potential for success also
expands. But the risk of overcrowding also exists when it comes
to carbon registration. In the United States, both the Climate
Registry and the EPA provide registration options.426 The
carbonn Cities Climate Registry offers registration options
internationally.427
Ironically, polycentric, bottom-up action is necessary to
truly move the climate change agenda forward, while at the
same time too much bottom-up action poses separate risks.
Nonetheless, this is the reality—“too much” of something is not
good, but neither is “too little.” A reliable, workable, and
trustworthy medium needs to be developed. This medium must
allow for a healthy amount of competition among program
solutions, perhaps even when it comes to registries. Time,
government action or inaction, public opinion, and the
marketplace will contribute to finding workable solutions. In
the meantime, actors with power to move the development in
the qualitative right direction should be aware of pitfalls posed
by focusing too narrowly on success for their own programs
only. These actors should also—as arguably is the case
already—consider the benefits of synergism between programs
on at least the international level where registries can co-exist,
425. See supra Part III.D.
426. See supra notes 268, 73 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
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even if this may not be the case at the national levels for
reasons of competition.
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change requires imminent action from as many
angles as possible. No one single solution is sufficiently
promising at this very late point in time. However, this much is
clear: waiting for national-level and supranational-level actors
to take substantively effective action in broad agreement with a
majority of other similarly situated actors is like waiting for
Godot—unlikely to happen, at least at an early enough point in
time. This article posits that local initiatives currently present
the most promising course of action for effective climate change
solutions. The article analyzes subnational, substate programs
with either no enforcement methods, limited methods, or
traditional methods. Of such local initiatives, the most
promising sources of procedural and substantive success are
those that are not scaled down to the purely private level, but
rather include involvement and oversight by somewhat larger
and more well-established bodies such as city coalitions or
recognized NGOs. Traditional law enforcement is not an
indispensable component of effective local climate change
initiatives; other modernly recognized methods of alternative
compliance securement can, if used correctly, be just as or even
more viable.
Opponents of local action may argue that there is no time
for local action within climate change. The response to this is
that there is only time for this. Although action by and an
interface to larger-scale governance units is still desirable if it
could be obtained, experience shows that we must look to
nontraditional actors to continue to step up climate-change
action to meet the climate challenge in the timeframe called for
by scientists. This is even more evident after the parties to the
climate change treaty negotiations under the UNFCCC regime
failed to agree on a broadly accepted renewal of the expired
Kyoto Protocol to take immediate effect, but instead only
reached an agreement that a second legally binding agreement
should be developed, adopted, and take effect by 2020.428 One
can hope that such an agreement will be drafted, but with the
uncertainties that abound in relation to what, after all,
428. Arup, supra note 64.
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amounts to mere hopes for a future that nobody can predict,
this is far from certain to be the case.429 In fact, the discussions
only weakened the second commitment period of the already too
modest Kyoto Protocol since the few parties who adopted
secondary binding emissions cuts by 2020 only account for
approximately 15% of global emissions.430 It seems impossible
to reach a broad and sufficiently deep solution by all parties to
the UNFCCC. On that scale, only narrower solutions such as
“clubs” of countries with a much more limited membership and
shared interests seems to be the best hope.
Climatologists continue to warn of a tipping point after
which the world is unlikely to be able to reverse unforeseeable,
but in all likelihood extreme and dangerous effects of climate
change.431 However, we may also reach a much more positive
tipping point—one at which action by a yet relatively small
amount of participants reaches such a critical mass that
effective climate change reduction becomes the order of the day
and not mere rhetoric about what could be. At that point in
time, the law of the few will be the law of the many.432
429. Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments, supra note 62.
430. See Ritter & Casey, supra note 63.
431. POJANATH BHATANACHAROEN ET AL., THE TIPPING POINT OF THE
‘TIPPING POINT’ METAPHOR: AGENCY AND PROCESS FOR WAVES OF CHANGE 1
(2004), available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ihrr/tippingpoints/OLKC
PaperforIHRR.pdf. The tipping point is defined as follows:
The term ‘tipping point’ in its most basic meaning refers to a critical
point when unprecedented changes occur rapidly with irreversible
effect. It entered the academic lexicon when it was used by the
political scientist Morton Grodzins in 1957 in his sociological studies
on racial segregation to describe the critical threshold at which point
the white population would leave an area where more and more black
people were present.
Id. at 1. The phrase was coined by analogy to physics where “[a]dding a small
amount of weight to a balanced object can cause it to suddenly and completely
topple.” Mark Heley, The Global Tipping Point, NETPLACES.COM, http://www.
netplaces.com/guide-to-2012/the-chaos-point-and-the-noosphere/the-globaltipping-point.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). Heley further defines the
tipping point as when “change in a complex system becomes unstoppable. This
tends to happen quickly and abruptly, rather than gradually and
incrementally.” Id. However, the phrase “the tipping point” was more widely
popularized by Malcolm Gladwell’s 2000 bestseller. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE
TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 19 (1st ed.
2000). Gladwell defines the “tipping point” as “the moment of critical mass, the
threshold, the boiling point,” at which changes within society, businesses, and
science become irreversible. Id. at 12.
432. The notion of “a tiny percentage of people do[ing] the majority of the
work” is what economists call the 80/20 principle. GLADWELL, supra note 431,
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Hopefully, that tipping point is right around the corner.
Anything else would be unacceptable.

at 19. This principle describes the notion that “in any situation roughly 80
percent of the ‘work’ will be done by 20 percent of the participants.” Id.

